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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I examine two related questions on whether and how tax 
aggressiveness of firms is associated with shareholder wealth in a new context – mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The first study investigates whether and how the tax aggressiveness of the 
acquirers and targets affects shareholder wealth. I present the idea of tax aggressiveness transfer 
whereby the acquirer’s propensity for tax planning applies to its target’s tax function after the 
change in ownership. I measure the degree of tax aggressiveness transfer using the relative tax 
aggressiveness of the acquirer and target (i.e., the difference in tax aggressiveness between the 
two firms). I find that acquisitions of more tax aggressive targets by less tax aggressive acquirers 
generate significantly lower acquisition gains. I also document weaker evidence that acquisitions 
of less tax aggressive targets by more tax aggressive acquirers generate higher acquisition gains. 
That is, the results suggest that the shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer are 
driven by the value-destroying effect of decreases in tax aggressiveness. Cross-sectional analyses 
reveal that the acquirer’s governance is a significant determinant of the shareholder wealth 
effects of tax aggressiveness transfer. Specifically, the results indicate that, when acquirers are 
well-governed, acquisitions of targets with lower tax aggressiveness by acquirers with higher tax 
aggressiveness are value-enhancing. Similarly, acquisitions of targets with higher tax 
aggressiveness by acquirers with lower tax aggressiveness are value-destroying. These findings 
are robust to various measures of tax aggressiveness. In sum, I find that tax aggressiveness 
transfer is a significant determinant of value creation or destruction in M&A. 
The second study is devoted to studying whether and how the target’s participation of tax 
shelters – an extreme form of tax aggressiveness – matters in acquirer’s valuation of the target 
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firm. Using a novel dataset that identifies targets’ non-participation in tax shelters, I find that the 
target’s non-sheltering status is associated with a higher takeover premium, indicating that 
acquirers reward targets for not engaging in tax sheltering. This positive association is stronger 
for targets that are more opaque and for acquirers that are less tax aggressive. In addition, I find 
that the target’s non-sheltering status is positively associated with acquirer returns for acquirers 
that are weakly governed and for targets that are more opaque. Overall, my findings suggest that 
the target’s non-sheltering status is relevant in acquirers’ valuation of the target, and that the 
valuation benefits of the target’s non-participation in tax shelters are mainly accrued to the 
target’s own shareholders rather than to those of the acquiring firm. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
  A relatively new area of accounting research seeks to develop a fuller understanding of 
the determinants and consequences of firms’ aggressive tax planning behavior or tax 
aggressiveness. Tax aggressiveness is defined as the reduction of explicit taxes per dollar of pre-
tax accounting earnings or cash flows through a continuum of tax planning strategies, where 
legal strategies such as tax-favored municipal bond investments are at the one end and tax 
sheltering is at the other end (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). Prior research has shown that firms 
engage in different forms of tax planning strategies to reduce taxes, and that some firms are more 
aggressive in avoiding taxes than other firms. For example, there is ample evidence that shows 
firms with foreign operations engage in cross-border tax avoidance by shifting income to low-tax 
jurisdictions or offshore tax havens (e.g., Harris, Morck, Slemrod, and Yeung, 1993; Hines and 
Rice 1994; Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson, 1993; Klassen and Laplante 2012) and by strategically 
locating their interest deductions in foreign tax jurisdictions (Dhaliwal and Newberry 2001). 
Dyreng, Lindsey, and Thornock (2012) find that U.S. firms reduce their state effective tax rates 
by between 0.7 and 1.1 percentage points by shifting income into Delaware with the use of a 
Passive Investment Company. Furthermore, extant research also documented that some firms 
adopt extreme tax avoidance strategies such as Corporate-Owned Life Insurance tax shelters 
(Brown 2011) or reportable transaction tax shelters (Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky, Robinson, and 
Schmidt 2012).   
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While extant literature has also shown that firms’ tax aggressive behaviors can be 
explained by management styles, ownership, organization of tax functions, and incentive 
structures (e.g., Chen, Chen, Cheng, Shevlin 2010; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; 
Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver 2010; and Wilson and Rego 2012), relatively little research (e.g., 
Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; and Wilson 2009) has examined 
whether and how tax aggressiveness affects shareholder wealth in part because of the lack of 
powerful research settings. In this dissertation, I examine two related questions on whether and 
how tax aggressiveness of firms is associated with shareholder wealth in a new context of M&A.  
The first study investigates whether and how the tax aggressiveness of the acquirer and target 
affects shareholder wealth. The second study is devoted to studying whether and how the target’s 
participation of tax shelters – an extreme form of tax aggressiveness – matters in acquirer’s 
valuation of the target firm. 
1.2 Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Shareholder Wealth 
M&A presents an excellent setting for studying the implications of tax aggressiveness on 
shareholder wealth. Existing research in this area such as Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and 
Wilson (2009) find that the association between tax aggressiveness and firm value depends on 
the firm’s corporate governance.  In particular, they document a positive association between tax 
aggressiveness and firm value for well-governed firms only. These studies rely on long-window 
association tests that are based on cross-sectional or time-series variation in tax aggressiveness 
and corporate governance. As pointed out in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), one empirical issue 
related to the use of existing tax aggressiveness measures based on financial statement data is 
that the variation in tax aggressiveness could be endogenous to other firm characteristics. 
Recognizing the potential endogeneity of tax aggressiveness, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) 
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employ the instrumental variable (IV) approach in their estimation. Corporate governance, 
however, is also endogenous (Chi 2005; Brown and Caylor 2006; Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
2007, Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010). For example, if higher valued firms are more 
likely to opt for both better governance structures and aggressive tax planning, it would be 
difficult to identify the impact of tax aggressiveness on shareholder wealth. In M&A, a change in 
ownership triggers an exogenous change in the target’s tax aggressiveness and corporate 
governance, providing a powerful quasi-experimental setting to investigate the question of 
whether changes in the target’s tax aggressiveness affect shareholder wealth creation. 
In particular, the first study presents the idea of a tax aggressiveness transfer whereby the 
acquirer’s propensity for tax planning applies to its target’s tax function after the change in 
ownership and examines whether shareholder wealth is associated with the extent of tax 
aggressiveness transfer. I use the relative tax aggressiveness of the acquirer and target to measure 
the degree of tax aggressiveness transfer. Using total book-tax difference developed in Manzon 
and Plesko (2002) as the main proxy for tax aggressiveness, I calculate the relative tax 
aggressiveness by subtracting the target’s tax aggressiveness proxy from the acquirer’s tax 
aggressiveness proxy. In a sample of 844 U.S. M&A transactions completed between 1990 and 
2010, I find that acquisitions of higher tax aggressiveness targets by lower tax aggressiveness 
acquirers generate significantly lower acquisition returns. To provide triangulating evidence, I 
document similar results using alternative measures of tax aggressiveness including abnormal 
book-tax difference (Desai and Dharmapala 2006), discretionary permanent book-tax difference 
(Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009), and cash effective tax rate (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 
2008). In addition, I examine the role of the acquirer’s corporate governance in the association 
between tax aggressiveness transfer and shareholder wealth. The results show that, when 
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acquirers are well-governed, acquisitions of targets with lower tax aggressiveness by acquirers 
with higher tax aggressiveness are value-enhancing. In contrast, when acquirers are poorly-
governed, acquisitions of less tax aggressive targets by more tax aggressive acquirers are value-
destroying. Overall, my findings are consistent with prior research that finds corporate 
governance is an important determinant of the association between tax aggressiveness and firm 
value (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009).  The results of this study provide a first step 
towards a better understanding of whether tax planning activities can be a source of gains 
resulting from M&A. 
1.3 The Target’s Tax Sheltering Status and Shareholder Wealth 
In the second study, I examine whether and how the target’s participation of tax shelters – 
an extreme form of tax aggressiveness – matters in acquires’ valuation of the target. Tax shelters 
are financial arrangements that aim to reduce income tax liability by exploiting loopholes in tax 
law (Department of Treasury 1999). Representing extreme forms of tax avoidance, tax shelters 
generate substantial tax savings for firms. For example, Graham and Tucker (2006) find that the 
median tax deduction associated with tax shelter use is more than $1 billion per firm per year, or 
about 9 percent of total assets for 24 of the sample firms in their study. Despite the economic 
significance of these tax benefits, few empirical studies specifically focus on investors’ valuation 
of tax sheltering firms. The reason for the lack of research in this area is primarily due to limited 
data. As claimed by Graham and Tucker (2006), information about tax sheltering is “notoriously 
hard to find” because firms do not publicly disclose their use of tax shelters and the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) tax investigation reports are confidential. Moreover, it is difficult to 
identify tax shelter participation from firms’ financial statements (Hanlon 2003; McGill and 
Outslay 2004). As a result, extant research on tax sheltering has generally relied on data from 
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Tax Court records (Graham and Tucker 2006; Wilson 2009), press releases (Hanlon and Slemrod 
2009; Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock 2012), and IRS tax shelter disclosures (Lisowsky 
2010; Lisowsky et al. 2012). Without new data sources, investors’ valuation of tax sheltering 
firms will remain an underexplored area in accounting research. 
The second study of this dissertation is devoted to studying investors’ valuation of tax 
sheltering firms by exploring a unique situation under which the target’s non-sheltering status is 
disclosed in the Form 8-K – Agreement and Plan of Merger. The disclosed non-sheltering status 
allows the ex post public identification of targets that have not participated in tax shelters and 
therefore serves as an appropriate proxy for the target’s underlying tax sheltering status prior to 
M&A. I test whether acquirers price targets differently based on whether or not the targets have 
engaged in tax sheltering and whether the valuation effect of the target’s non-sheltering status is 
shared by acquirer shareholders. Using the disclosed non-sheltering status as a proxy for the 
target’s actual non-sheltering status, I find that the target’s non-sheltering status is associated 
with a higher takeover premium. This association remains positive and significant after 
controlling for the target’s tax aggressiveness using existing measures. Also, this positive 
association is significantly stronger for targets that are more opaque and for acquirers that are 
less tax aggressive. Moreover, I find that the association between the target’s non-sheltering 
status and acquirer returns is significantly positive for acquirers that are weakly governed and for 
targets that are more opaque. In sum, my results suggest that the positive valuation effect of the 
target’s non-participation in tax shelters is mainly captured by the target’s own shareholders 
rather than by those of the acquirer, but acquirer shareholders can enjoy higher acquisition gains 
from a non-sheltering target if the acquirer’s governance is weak or if the target’s information 
environment is not transparent. This study contributes to the tax avoidance literature by 
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proposing a new measure of tax aggressiveness – the firm’s non-sheltering status; and by 
showing that acquirers factor the tax risks related to the target’s tax shelter involvement into the 
premium determination. 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of 
prior research on tax aggressiveness. Chapter 3 presents the first study on tax aggressiveness 
transfer and shareholder wealth. Chapter 4 presents the second study on the target’s tax 
sheltering status and shareholder wealth. Each chapter is further organized into four sections: 
introduction, hypothesis development, research design and main results. Chapter 5 concludes the 
dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction 
A growing area of accounting research seeks to develop a fuller understanding of 
aggressive tax planning behavior. Although extant literature has shown that firms engage in 
different forms of tax planning strategies to reduce taxes, and that some firms are more tax 
aggressive than other firms are, relatively little is known regarding the valuation implications of 
tax aggressiveness to shareholders. This dissertation aims to provide new insights to this area by 
conducting two related studies that examine whether and how tax aggressiveness matters in 
shareholder wealth in the context of M&A. Although existing literature on the valuation effects 
of tax aggressiveness is more relevant to my studies, a thorough understanding of the literature 
on the determinants of tax aggressiveness is key to the development of my hypotheses in the first 
study. Therefore, in the following two sections, I review existing literature on the determinants 
and consequences of tax aggressiveness. 
2.2  Determinants of Tax Aggressiveness 
Extant literature has documented a number of observable firm-level characteristics that 
are associated with the cross-sectional variation in tax aggressiveness of firms using different 
data sources. For example, Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) analyze the determinants of 
investments in tax planning using a confidential survey that contains tax-related expenditures 
data of 365 large U.S. firms from Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993). Their main findings are: (1) 
larger firms spend proportionately less on tax planning than small firms, (2) firms with foreign 
operations invest more heavily in tax planning than do firms without foreign operations, (3) 
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capital intensity and the number of entities in the firm are positively related to firm expenditures 
on tax planning, and (4) inventory intensity and leverage are not consistently related to 
expenditures on tax planning.  
Dyreng et al. (2008) develop a measure of long-run tax avoidance based on firms’ cash 
effective tax rates. They find that 22 percent of their 437 sample firms were able to sustain a cash 
effective tax rate of less than 20 percent over a ten year period. They also examine the 
characteristics and attributes of those successful long-run tax avoiding firms. Their findings 
indicate that firms that have a lower long-run effective tax rate are generally large, more 
profitable, incorporated in a tax haven, highly leveraged, having a lot of fixed assets and 
intangible assets, and reporting large special items. They also find that successful tax avoiding 
firms tend to be firms in certain industries such as oil and gas extraction, insurance, and real 
estate.  They emphasize that, however, these observable factors only contribute to a fraction (at 
most 22.6 percent) of the cross-sectional variation in long-run effective tax rate. 
Using a set of firms identified in Tax Court records and press articles as having 
participated in corporate tax shelters, Wilson (2009) develops a profile of the type of firm likely 
engaged in tax sheltering. Consistent with the findings in Rego (2003) and those in Dyreng et al. 
(2008), Wilson’s (2009) findings suggest that firms actively engaged in tax sheltering are larger 
in size, more profitable, and have higher income from foreign operations. In addition, his 
findings also indicate that tax shelter participation is associated with larger ex post book-tax 
differences and more aggressive financial reporting behavior.  
Also studying firm characteristics that are linked to tax shelter participation, Lisowsky 
(2010) extends prior research (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008 and Wilson 2009) using confidential tax 
shelter data obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). He finds that tax shelter 
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likelihood is positively related to firm size, profitability, subsidiaries located in tax havens, 
foreign-source income, inconsistent book-tax treatment, litigation losses, use of promoters, and 
negatively related to leverage. More important, he also finds that total book-tax differences are 
significantly related to tax shelter usage, while discretionary permanent book-tax differences and 
long-run cash effective tax rates are not. 
In addition to documenting the firm characteristics that explain the cross-sectional 
variation in tax aggressiveness, recent research also investigates the role of management styles of 
firm executives, organization of tax functions, and ownership in determining the tax 
aggressiveness of firms. For example, Dyreng et al. (2010) investigate whether individual top 
executives have incremental effects on their firms’ tax avoidance that cannot be explained by 
characteristics of the firm. To identify executive effects on firms’ effective tax rates, they 
construct a dataset that tracks the movement of 899 executives across firms over time. Their 
results indicate that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of tax 
avoidance that firms undertake. Specifically, moving between the top and bottom quartiles of 
executives results in approximately an 11 percent change in effective tax rates. Overall, the paper 
demonstrates that executive effects are an important determinant in firms’ tax avoidance and, in 
turn, firms’ after-tax profitability. 
Robinson et al. (2010) investigate why firms choose to evaluate a tax department as a 
profit center (“contributor to the bottom line”) as opposed to as a cost center and the association 
between this choice and effective tax rates (ETRs). Using data from a confidential survey taken 
in 1999 of Chief Financial Officers, they develop and test a theory for choosing between these 
two methods of evaluating a tax department. They find that the likelihood of evaluating the tax 
department as a profit center is increasing in firm decentralization characteristics and tax 
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planning opportunities. They then employ instrumental variables to investigate whether 
evaluating a tax department as a profit center provides an effective incentive for the tax 
department to contribute to net income through lower ETRs. They find that their instrument for 
profit center firms is associated with significantly lower ETRs than cost center firms. Overall, 
their results indicate that the organization of tax function has a strong influence on the firm’s tax 
practices. 
Chen et al. (2010) examine the tax aggressiveness of family firms, relative to their non-
family counterparts. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and different proxies 
for founding family presence, they find that family firms exhibit lower tax aggressiveness, 
contrary to the notion that family firms would exhibit a higher level of tax aggressiveness as 
family owners will benefit more from tax savings. Their analysis of Graham and Tucker’s (2006) 
tax sheltering firms also shows that family firms are less likely to use tax shelters. It also 
contributes toward a better understanding of the impact of ownership on firms’ tax reporting 
practices. 
Badertscher, Katz, and Rego (2011) investigate whether private equity (PE) firms 
influence the tax practices of their portfolio firms. In particular, they examine whether PE firms 
influence the extent and types of tax avoidance at portfolio firms as an additional source of 
economic value. They document that PE-backed portfolio firms engage in significantly more 
nonconforming tax planning and have lower marginal tax rates than other private firms. 
Moreover, they document that PE-backed portfolio firms pay 14.2 percent less income tax per 
dollar of pre-tax income than non-PE backed firms, after controlling for NOLs and debt tax 
shields. They find additional tax savings for PE-backed portfolio firms that are either majority-
owned or owned by large PE firms, consistent with PE ownership stake, expertise, and resources 
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serving as important factors in the tax practices of portfolio firms. Overall, they infer that PE 
firms view tax planning as an additional source of economic value in their portfolio firms, where 
the benefits outweigh any potential reputational costs associated with corporate tax avoidance. 
Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield (2012) examine the impact of activist hedge funds on 
corporate tax avoidance. They find that target firms of hedge fund activism experience increases 
in levels of tax avoidance after fund intervention and the increases in tax avoidance are 
positively associated with hedge fund filers' experience in activist activities and their past 
success in implementing tax changes. They also document a link between changes in target 
firms’ tax avoidance and fund activists’ interest and expertise in tax issues as indicated in their 
SEC filings. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that shareholder monitoring by 
activist hedge funds improves tax efficiency.  
In sum, existing literature suggests that, in addition to firms’ operating characteristics 
such as firm size, profitability, and foreign operations, firm-level factors including management 
styles of firm executives, organization of tax functions, and ownership all have significant 
influence on the level of tax aggressiveness of firms. 
2.3  Consequences of Tax Aggressiveness 
After reviewing extant literature that examines factors explaining the cross-sectional 
variation of tax aggressiveness, in this section, I review research that devoted in studying the 
consequences of tax aggressiveness. As one of the first studies in this area, Mills et al. (1998) 
quantify the returns to investments in tax planning and provide empirical evidence that firms’ 
investments in tax planning are associated with lower tax liabilities: an additional $1 investment 
in tax planning results in a more than $4 reduction in tax liabilities after controlling for tax 
opportunities.  
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Graham and Tucker (2006) collect a unique sample of 44 tax shelter cases at 43 firms 
from 1975 to 2000 and investigate the magnitude of tax shelter activity and whether participating 
in a shelter is related to corporate debt policy. They find that the average annual deduction 
produced by the shelters in their sample is approximately nine percent of asset value – more than 
three times as large as interest deductions for comparable companies. They also find that firms 
that use tax shelters use less debt on average than non-shelter firms do. Regression coefficients 
indicate that tax sheltering firms’ debt-to-asset ratios are more than 5 percentage points lower 
than leverage for non-shelter firms. Their results are consistent with tax shelters being a non-debt 
tax shield that substitutes for the use of interest tax deductions (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980). 
Thus, if aggressive tax planning were costless to the firm, firm value would increase 
because the tax authority could take a smaller fraction of the firm’s profits (Desai and 
Dharmapala 2008; 2009). However, tax aggressiveness is not without cost to the firm. Firms 
incur higher direct costs such as compliance and consulting fees when implementing more 
aggressive tax planning strategies. In addition to these direct costs of tax aggressiveness, tax 
aggressiveness is potentially costly to many firms in a variety of dimensions.  
For example, using confidential data from tax returns from the Coordinated Examination 
Program between 1982 and 1992, Mills (1998) finds that IRS audit adjustments increase as 
book-tax differences increase, suggesting that more tax aggressive firms have higher IRS 
scrutiny than less tax aggressive firms do, and that firms cannot maximize financial earnings and 
tax benefits independently in a costless way. Moreover, results from Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) 
suggest that aggressive tax planning is viewed negatively by the market. Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009) investigate the stock market reaction to news releases of firms’ participation in tax 
shelters. They document a negative market reaction over the three day window surrounding 
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major press mentions of firms’ participation in tax shelters. Their results suggest that tax shelter 
news is viewed as a negative event by the market. However, additional tests suggest that the 
negative market reaction to tax shelter news is not predominantly a reputational effect. 
Recognizing that the difficulty in examining the effects of reputational concern on tax 
aggressiveness in an empirical setting, Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2012) conduct a 
survey of nearly 600 corporate tax executives to better understand why some firms are more 
aggressive in avoiding taxes than other firms. The results of their survey indicate that tax 
executives consider risk of IRS challenge, possibility of restatement, and reputational costs to be 
important factors in their own firm’s decision not to implement tax strategies marketed by 
accounting firms or investment banks. 
In addition to the aforementioned costs that are directly related to the underlying 
aggressive tax positions, agency costs can offset the benefits of reduced tax payments. Desai, 
Dyck, and Zingales (2007) argue that the complexity and obscurity of tax avoidance 
arrangements can provide self-serving managers with tools and justifications for rent-diverting 
activities such as earnings manipulation and insider trading. Building on Desai et al.’s (2007) 
perspectives on tax aggressiveness, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) investigate whether tax 
aggressiveness advance shareholder interests by analyzing how markets capitalize these 
activities. They find that the simple presumption that corporate tax avoidance represents a 
transfer of value from the state to shareholders does not appear to be validated in the data. 
Rather, the patterns in the data are more consistent with the agency perspective on corporate tax 
avoidance, which emphasizes the mediating role of governance. In particular, they find that 
higher quality firm governance allows tax aggressive firms to achieve significant positive firm 
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value, but the association between tax aggressiveness and firm value is not statistically 
significant for poorly-governed firms.  
Other empirical studies that examine the valuation implications of tax aggressiveness 
generally document results consistent with those in Desai and Dharmapala (2009). Wilson 
(2009) finds that active tax shelter firms with strong corporate governance earn significant 
positive abnormal returns, whereas tax shelter firms with weak governance earn significantly 
lower abnormal returns. Koester (2011) also extends this line of research using the tax reserves 
for uncertain tax positions under FAS 109/FIN 48 to proxy for tax aggressiveness. She finds that 
shareholder returns are positively associated with changes in tax aggressiveness in firms with 
strong governance for a sample of S&P 500 firms between 2007 and 2009.  
In sum, extant research provides empirical evidence consistent with the agency 
perspectives of tax aggressiveness (Desai et al. 2007 and Desai and Dharmapala 2009). 
2.4 The Role of Tax Attributes in M&A 
A large body of research in accounting and finance has examined the roles that taxes play 
in the pricing of M&A by considering the tax attributes of the merging firms and their 
shareholders. This section provides a brief review on this stream of literature.  
Prior literature on the effects of merging firms’ tax attributes on M&A can trace back to 
Hayn (1989), which examines a sample of 640 M&A deals from 1970 to 1985 and finds that the 
tax attributes of targets, such as expiring tax credits and step-up in the basis of the acquired 
assets, are significant in explaining merger announcement abnormal returns of both target and 
acquiring firms. Using a sample of 200 subsidiary stock acquisitions, Erickson and Wang (2000) 
document evidence that acquirers pay a higher premium for tax benefits associated with the 
election of IRC Section 338(h) (10). Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Heitzman (2004) find that, in a 
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sample of hospital sales, the purchase price is higher when the seller is taxable than when the 
seller is tax-exempt, suggesting that sellers with larger tax liabilities demand a higher price to 
compensate for transactional tax liabilities from the sale. Erickson and Wang (2007) report that 
taxable acquisitions of S corporations carry a tax-driven purchase price premium relative to that 
of similar privately-held C corporation acquisitions, consistent with the prediction in Scholes, 
Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin (2005) that the organizational form of the target 
influences acquisition price. 
In addition to examining effects of the tax attributes of the merging firms on acquisition 
price, prior research has also looked at the effects of the tax status of the shareholders on 
takeover premium. For example, by exploiting the cross-temporal variations in long-term capital 
gains tax rate regimes for a sample of acquisitions between 1975 and 2000, Ayers, Lefanowicz, 
and Robinson (2003 and 2004) find that acquisition premiums in taxable acquisitions and the use 
of tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions increase with individual shareholder capital gains taxes, 
and these positive associations are mitigated by institutional ownership.  
Recent research has also examined the effects of tax benefits and costs on takeover 
premium in an international setting. Mescall and Klassen (2013) develop a country-year specific 
measure of transfer pricing risk based on a proprietary survey of 76 transfer pricing experts from 
34 countries. Their results suggest that acquirers pay a lower takeover premium to targets as the 
risk associated with transfer pricing policies and enforcement increases.  
In keeping with this line of research on the effects of the merging firms’ tax attributes on 
acquisition price, this dissertation considers tax aggressiveness as a tax attribute processed by 
both the acquires and targets, and suggests that this previously overlooked tax attribute can 
explain shareholder wealth creation or destruction in M&A. 
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2.5  Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the extant literature on the determinants and 
consequences of tax aggressiveness. Extant research generally finds that observable firm traits 
such as firm size, profitability, and foreign operations can explain the cross-sectional variation in 
tax aggressiveness. In addition, recent studies have also shown that firm-level factors including 
management styles of firm executives, organization of tax functions, and ownership are key 
factors in determining a firm’s tax aggressiveness. In addition, existing research documents 
results that are consistent with corporate governance to be an important determinant of the 
association between tax aggressiveness and firm value, as suggested by the agency perspectives 
of tax aggressiveness (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 2009). Finally, I also provide a 
review on the literature that examine the roles that taxes play in the pricing of M&A. This 
dissertation considers tax aggressiveness to be a firm-level tax attribute that can explain 
shareholder wealth creation or destruction in M&A. 
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Chapter 3 
Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Shareholder Wealth 
 We have identified… an additional $50 million of tax related savings synergies 
amounting from the new structure. The ongoing effective tax rate of about 24% to 
26% reflects the new company’s structure before any incremental tax planning 
initiatives… We have over $90 million in synergies right from the start through one 
corporate structure and greater tax efficiencies. 
 ––– Randall Hogan, Chairman and CEO, and John Stauch, CFO, Pentair               
from the Tyco-Pentair merger conference call 
 
 
3.1 Introduction and Contributions 
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) estimate that, using a sample of 3,688 completed 
mergers between 1973 and 1998, the average three-day abnormal return for acquirers as well as 
for acquirer and target combined are -0.7 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively. While the extent 
of acquisition gains or losses from mergers are well-documented, Andrade et al. (2001) 
emphasize that identifying the underlying sources of the valuation effects in M&A remains a 
challenging issue. A long stream of literature has considered tax to be one of the sources of value 
creation in M&A (e.g. Auerbach and Reishus 1988; Hayn 1989; Erickson and Wang 2007). 
These prior studies, however, have primarily focused on the role that tax plays at the transaction 
level. As noted in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), little is known about how tax aggressiveness 
affects M&A. This study attempts to provide a first step towards a better understanding of 
whether tax aggressiveness can be a source of gains or losses resulting from M&A.  
 18 
 
Specifically, this study presents the idea of a tax aggressiveness transfer whereby the 
acquirer’s propensity for tax planning applies to its target’s tax function after the change in 
ownership. In other words, I expect that the newly merged firm will share the tax aggressiveness 
features of the acquirer upon the change in ownership in M&A. As the traditional view of tax 
aggressiveness suggests, aggressive tax planning would increase firm value as the tax authority 
takes a smaller fraction of the firm’s profits (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; 2009). I extend this 
line of literature by empirically examining whether acquisitions of targets with lower tax 
aggressiveness by acquirers with higher tax aggressiveness generate higher acquisition gains, and 
vice versa. 
I define tax aggressiveness as the reduction of explicit taxes per dollar of pre-tax 
accounting earnings or cash flows through a continuum of tax planning strategies, where 
strategies such as tax favored municipal bond investments are at the one end and more 
complicated strategies such as tax sheltering are at the other end. I determine the degree of tax 
aggressiveness transfer by measuring the difference between the acquirer’s and the target’s tax 
aggressiveness, or the relative tax aggressiveness of the two firms, prior to the acquisition. I 
break down the tax aggressiveness transfer measure into positive and negative values to 
investigate whether increases in tax aggressiveness create value, decreases in tax aggressiveness 
destroy value, or both. I use four common proxies of tax aggressiveness advanced in the 
literature to provide triangulating evidence. These proxies include total book-tax difference 
(Manzon and Plesko 2002), abnormal book-tax difference (Desai and Dharmapala 2006), 
discretionary permanent book-tax difference (Frank et al. 2009), and cash effective tax rates 
(Dyreng et al. 2008). Using a sample of 844 U.S. M&A transactions completed between 1990 
and 2010, I find that, on average, acquirers have a wider book-tax difference and a lower cash 
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effective tax rate than targets have. Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), I measure 
acquisition gains for each transaction by computing the cumulative abnormal return for a value-
weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target during the five-day event window surrounding 
the merger announcement date. To better understand the way that the acquisition gains are 
divided between the shareholders of the acquirers and those of the targets, I also compute the 
cumulative abnormal returns separately for the acquirers and targets.  
Consistent with my prediction, regression results indicate that acquisitions of more tax 
aggressive targets by less tax aggressive acquirers generate significantly lower acquisition gains, 
while acquisitions of less tax aggressive targets by more tax aggressive acquirers generate higher 
acquisition gains. The evidence, however, is weaker in the latter direction. That is, my findings 
suggest that the shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer are driven by the value-
destroying effect of decreases in tax aggressiveness. The results also indicate that this value-
destroying wealth effect of negative tax aggressiveness transfer is mainly accrued to shareholders 
of the acquirers rather than to those of the targets. The results are consistent across various 
proxies of tax aggressiveness. 
Next, I examine the role of the acquirer’s corporate governance in the wealth effects of 
tax aggressiveness transfer. Using the Governance Index (G-Index) developed in Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) to measure corporate governance, I find that the acquirer’s governance is a 
significant determinant of the effects of tax aggressiveness transfer on shareholder wealth.
1
 
Specifically, I find that, when acquirers are well-governed, acquisitions of targets with lower tax 
aggressiveness by acquirers with higher tax aggressiveness are value-enhancing. Similarly, 
acquisitions of targets with higher tax aggressiveness by acquirers with lower tax aggressiveness 
                                                     
1
 Gompers et al. (2003) construct the G-Index based on 24 anti-takeover provisions that capture firms’ shareholder 
rights. 
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are value-destroying. My findings are consistent with prior research that finds corporate 
governance to be a significant determinant of the relation between tax aggressiveness and firm 
value (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009).  
This study contributes to existing literature on the effects of tax aggressiveness on 
shareholder wealth in two ways. First, the M&A setting allows separate examination of the 
valuation implications of increases and decreases in tax aggressiveness, thus providing new 
insights into the ways in which tax aggressiveness affects shareholder wealth. Although prior 
literature (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009) has shown that there is a positive 
valuation effect of tax aggressiveness for well-governed firms, those studies do not examine the 
valuation effects of increases and decreases in tax aggressiveness separately, in part because of 
the limitations of the research setting. For example, firms’ tax planning policies do not typically 
change within a short period of time, so the year-to-year changes in tax aggressiveness measures 
such as changes in book-tax difference could be a noisy measure of changes in tax 
aggressiveness. Also, it is difficult to determine precisely when the tax shelter firms started and 
terminated their tax shelters in the tax shelter firm sample in Wilson (2009). In contrast, the 
M&A setting allows a clear identification of positive and negative changes in the target’s level of 
tax aggressiveness, depending on which firm (i.e., the target or the acquirer) was more tax 
aggressive prior to the deal. My finding that the shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness 
transfer are predominantly driven by the value-destroying effects of negative tax aggressiveness 
transfer contributes to a fuller understanding of the ways in which tax aggressiveness affects 
shareholder wealth.  
Second, this study overcomes the potential limitation in addressing the endogeneity 
problem related to a firm’s tax aggressiveness, governance practices, and firm value by adopting 
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a powerful research setting – M&A. Since a firm’s characteristics of corporate governance 
practices and the firm’s level of tax aggressiveness are both endogenously determined (Chi 2005; 
Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), results using long-window tests that are based on cross-sectional 
variations in tax aggressiveness and governance may be unreliable. In the context of M&A, the 
acquirer’s governance structure will determine the governance structure of the merged firm upon 
a successful acquisition (Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis 2008; Wang and Xie 2008). Likewise, the 
acquirer’s tax aggressiveness will determine the tax aggressiveness of the merged firm. In effect, 
this change in ownership triggers an exogenous change in the target’s tax aggressiveness and 
corporate governance. Thus, the results of my short-window tests provide stronger inferences on 
the question of whether changes in firms’ tax aggressiveness, along with changes in their 
corporate governance, affect shareholder wealth.  
This paper also contributes to the literature on M&A. Prior literature documents that the 
benefits of change in ownership are, on average, negative for acquirer shareholders and positive 
for the acquirer and target combined (Andrade et al. 2001); nevertheless, the underlying sources 
of these valuation effects remain unclear. Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009) 
investigate the relative importance of the underlying source of acquisition gains. Based on Value 
Line post-merger capital cash flow forecasts for a sample of 264 mergers, the authors break 
down the acquisition gains into two components: improvements in operating efficiency and tax 
savings. They estimate that, of the 10.02 percent of average acquisition gains, operating-related 
synergies contribute 8.38 percent, whereas tax savings contribute only 1.64 percent.  
The tax savings estimate in Devos et al. (2009) only accounts for the increase in debt tax 
shields based on the debt level forecast for the merged firm. However, as documented in prior 
studies, there is ample empirical evidence that firms engage in different forms of aggressive tax 
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planning to reduce taxes (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008). For example, these tax strategies include 
cross-border tax avoidance such as the use of foreign operations located in low-tax jurisdictions 
(Harris et al. 1993; Hines and Rice 1994; Klassen et al. 1993; Klassen and Laplante 2012) and 
tax sheltering such as the use of Corporate-Owned Life Insurance transactions (Brown 2011) or 
reportable transactions (Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2012). More important, the benefits 
from engaging in these aggressive tax avoidance activities could represent significant non-debt 
tax shields for firms (Graham and Tucker, 2006). Using the cross-sectional variation in tax 
aggressiveness between the acquirers and the targets, this study improves the estimates of tax-
related acquisition gains by considering tax savings generated by a broader spectrum of 
corporate tax avoidance strategies. In keeping with the research on the roles of taxes in the 
pricing and structure of M&A (e.g., Hayn 1989; Erickson 1998; Erickson and Wang 2000, 2007; 
Ayers et al. 2003, 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; Devos et al. 2009), this study contributes to the 
literature by showing that tax aggressiveness transfer from the acquirer to the target explains 
acquirer shareholder gains from M&A and responds to Hanlon and Heitzman’s (2010) call for 
more research on whether tax aggressiveness affects M&A. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section develops testable hypotheses that build on the themes reviewed in the 
previous section. Section 3.2.2 discusses existing literature on the benefits of a change in 
ownership. Section 3.2.3 summarizes findings in the previous literature that finds management 
styles, corporate culture, and ownership profiles to be significant determinants of a firm’s 
aggressiveness in tax practices. Building on the discussion in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, Section 
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3.2.4 presents the two hypotheses related to how tax aggressiveness transfer from the acquirer to 
the target affects acquisition gains. Section 3.2.5 provides a summary of the section. 
3.2.2 The Effects of Change in Ownership in M&A 
In M&A, the acquirer’s management essentially replaces the target’s management after 
the change in ownership. Prior literature in finance has documented evidence that this change in 
the quality of management is an important determinant of value creation in M&A. For example, 
using a sample of successful tender offers from 1968 to 1980, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) 
and Servaes (1991) find that gains from acquisitions are larger when targets have low Tobin’s q 
and acquirers have high Tobin’s q, suggesting that acquisitions of poorly managed targets by 
better managed acquirers generate higher acquisition gains. In particular, they find that bidder 
abnormal returns, target abnormal returns, and the abnormal returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of the bidder and the target are higher when bidders have higher q ratios and targets 
have low q ratios. The best takeovers, in terms of value creation, are those where a high q firm 
takes over a low q firm. If q is interpreted as a measure of managerial performance, their results 
support the view that financial markets reward well-managed firms, namely, high q firms, taking 
over poorly managed firms. 
Similar to Lang et al.’s (1989), Servaes (1991) analyzes the relation between takeover 
gains and the q ratios of targets and bidders for a sample of 704 M&A transactions and tender 
offers over the period 1972-1987.  The cross-sectional regression results show that the relative 
measures of Tobin’s q can explain target, bidder, and total abnormal returns generated in the 
takeover. The significance of the relation between q and takeover gains is actually enhanced, 
after controlling for the characteristics of the offer and the contest. The abnormal returns of 
targets and bidders are larger when targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios. He 
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further shows that returns are also related to the form of payment, the number of bidders, the 
reaction of target management, the time period of the takeover, and the relative size of targets 
and bidders. 
Using the cross-country variation in investor protection regimes, Bris et al. (2008) study 
how changes in shareholder protection induced by cross-border mergers improve industry value. 
For each of 39 industries in 41 countries over the period 1990-2001, they construct measures of 
the corporate governance quality of the industry considering the cross-border mergers by and of 
firms in that industry. Using shareholder protection and accounting standards as corporate 
governance indicators, they find that acquisitions of firms in weaker shareholder protection 
countries by firms in stronger protective regimes significantly increase the value of the target 
industry (as measured by industry Tobin’s q). However, targets acquired by firms from worse 
corporate governance environments do not lose value. Overall, they present evidence that the 
transfer of corporate governance practices through cross-border mergers is Pareto improving. 
Firms that can adopt better practices willingly do so, and the market assigns more value to better 
protection. 
Wang and Xie (2008) find that acquisitions of poorly-governed targets by better governed 
acquirers create higher acquisition gains. Specifically, using the Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-Index 
to measure the level of shareholder rights, Wang and Xie (2008) find that acquisition gains are 
increasing in acquirers’ shareholder rights relative to targets’ shareholder rights. Their results 
support the hypothesis that acquisitions of firms with poor corporate governance by firms with 
good corporate governance generate higher total gains. Overall, the potential benefits generated 
by a change in ownership have been focused on the role of corporate governance as a source of 
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value creation. This study aims to explore an additional source of gains created by change in 
ownership: corporate tax aggressiveness. 
3.2.3 Tax Aggressiveness Transfer in M&A 
As reviewed in Section 2.2, prior literature on the determinants of tax aggressiveness 
supports the view that newly merged firm will share the tax aggressiveness features of the 
acquirers. In particular, Dyreng et al. (2010) track the movement of 899 executives across firms 
over time and find that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of 
corporate tax aggressiveness. Using data from a confidential survey of Chief Financial Officers, 
Robinson et al. (2010) find that firms that choose to evaluate a tax department as a profit center 
are associated with significantly lower effective tax rates, suggesting that the organization of tax 
function has a strong influence on the firm’s tax aggressiveness. Chen et al. (2010) suggest that, 
compared to non-family firms, firms owned or run by founding family members are less tax 
aggressive, possibly because they are more concerned with the costs associated with tax 
aggressiveness (e.g., price discount, IRS penalty, and reputational damage). Badertscher et al. 
(2011) find that private equity backed portfolio firms engage in significantly more non-
conforming tax avoidance and have lower marginal tax rates than other private firms, suggesting 
that managers in private equity firms create economic value through aggressive tax planning. 
Similarly, investigating the role of hedge fund activism in corporate tax avoidance, Cheng et al. 
(2012) find that tax-savvy hedge fund activists improve the tax efficiency of their portfolio firms. 
Taken as a whole, evidence from existing literature suggests that management styles, corporate 
culture, and ownership profiles strongly influence a firm’s aggressiveness in tax practices.  
 26 
 
3.2.4 Hypotheses 
Based on these findings, I expect a change in ownership will result in an increase or a 
decrease in the target’s tax aggressiveness, depending on whether the acquirer is more or less tax 
aggressive than the target is. I argue that a less tax aggressive target will become more valuable, 
if merged with an acquirer with an aggressive tax department, and vice versa. My predictions are 
stated formally as hypotheses H1 and H2 below: 
H1: Acquisitions of less tax aggressive targets by more tax aggressive acquirers 
generate higher acquisition gains. 
 
   
H2: Acquisitions of more tax aggressive targets by less tax aggressive acquirers 
generate lower acquisition gains. 
 
   
My hypotheses are not without tension. First, the hypotheses build on an assumption that 
the tax aggressiveness of the acquirers will apply to the targets post-acquisition. Although extant 
research provides support for this view, a related study suggests that this might not be the case. 
Blouin, Collins, and Shackelford (2005) examine the impact of foreign-controlled firms on tax 
aggressiveness by comparing changes in taxable income of 31 U.S. domiciled firms before and 
after being acquired by non-U.S. shareholders in 1996. They find no evidence that foreign-
controlled firms increase the tax aggressiveness of their newly acquired U.S. targets. Although 
tax considerations are important in M&A, they are unlikely to be the primary reason behind a 
transaction. Thus, it might be difficult to detect the effects of changes in tax aggressiveness in the 
setting of cross-border M&A with a small sample. In this study, I employ a larger sample and 
focus on domestic M&A transactions between U.S. acquirers and U.S. targets, avoiding any 
potential unobserved attributes associated with foreign firms that may affect the results.  
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3.2.5 Section Summary 
Extant literature has focused on the role of corporate governance as a source of value 
creation in a change in ownership. I argue that corporate tax aggressiveness could be an 
additional source of gains from a change in ownership. As management styles, corporate culture, 
and ownership profiles could strongly influence a firm’s aggressiveness in tax practices, a 
change in ownership will result in an increase or a decrease in the target’s tax aggressiveness, 
depending on whether the acquirer is more or less tax aggressive than the target is. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that a less tax aggressive target will become more valuable, if merged with an 
acquirer with an aggressive tax department, and vice versa. 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the research design and sample used to test hypotheses H1 and H2 
developed in Section 3.2. I begin with a description of how I measure acquisition gains in 
Section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 describes how I measure tax aggressiveness transfer from the 
acquirer to the target. Section 3.3.4 presents regression specifications to test the hypotheses. 
Section 3.3.5 outlines my sample selection criteria. Section 3.3.6 concludes. 
3.3.2 Measures of Acquisition Gains 
I measure acquisition gains in percentage returns using the method developed by Bradley 
et al. (1988). For each transaction, I form a value-weighted portfolio of the acquiring and target 
firms, determining weights based on the firms’ respective market capitalizations on the 11th 
trading day prior to the merger announcement date. Announcement dates are obtained from 
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Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. The target’s 
capitalization is adjusted by subtracting the value of the target equity held by the acquirer before 
the merger announcement. The acquisition gains are defined as the portfolio cumulative 
abnormal return (PCAR) during the event window [-2, +2], in which event day 0 is the 
announcement date. To calculate portfolio abnormal returns, I use the simple market model to 
estimate expected stock return for portfolio i on day t following the standard methodology for 
event study analysis (Brown and Warner 1985):    
 ARit = Rit – αi – βi Rm,t (1) 
where Ri,t  is the realized return to portfolio i on day t. The parameters αi and βi are estimated over 
the 200-day window before the announcement period [-210, -11] using CRSP value-weighted    
return as the market return (Rm, t). The five-day announcement period cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for portfolio i is computed as follows:  
 

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(2) 
Although the focus of this study is on the combined acquisition gains of both the acquirer 
and target, I am also interested in the split of acquisition gains between the shareholders of the 
two firms. To further examine the division of acquisition gains between the shareholders of the 
acquirer and target, I separately compute the five-day cumulative abnormal returns for the 
acquirer (ACAR) and the target (TCAR). 
3.3.3 Measures of Tax Aggressiveness Transfer 
My primary proxy for tax aggressiveness is the total book-tax difference (BTD) measure 
based on Manzon and Plesko (2002). Total BTD measures the extent to which estimated taxable 
income deviates from reported book income. A positive gap in total BTD indicates the firm’s 
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aggressiveness in pursuing tax strategies that leads to a decrease in taxable income without 
decreasing book income. I choose total BTD to be the primary measure of tax aggressiveness 
because existing literature has documented evidence that BTD maps the footprints of firms’ tax 
aggressive behaviors. For example, Mills (1998) finds that firms with higher BTD are more 
likely to be audited by the IRS and are subject to more audit adjustments, suggesting that BTD is 
used by the tax authority to identify potential tax avoiders. In addition, Wilson (2009) and 
Lisowsky (2010) find that total BTD is a useful proxy for explaining the incidence of tax shelter 
activities. Although Lisowsky et al. (2012) show that FIN 48 tax reserve is a good measure for 
predicting tax shelter participation, I did not choose FIN 48 tax reserve to be one of my proxies 
for tax aggressiveness because these data are only available after 2007 and would result in a very 
small sample size. My research question focuses on whether the tax aggressiveness of the 
acquirer relative to that of the target is associated with acquisition gains. To construct a measure 
of the extent of tax aggressiveness transfer, or the relative tax aggressiveness, I use the difference 
in tax aggressiveness (D_BTD) between acquirer i and target j as follows: 
  
D_BTDi,j,t-1 = BTDi,t-1 – BTDj,t-1 (3)  
where BTD = [ ( Pre-tax income – taxable income – state income taxes – other income 
taxes – equity in earnings) / lagged assets ]  
 
where taxable income = { [ (current federal tax expense + current foreign tax expense ) – 
change in tax loss carry-forward ] / statutory tax rate } 
 
  
  
As noted in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), total BTD only captures aggressive behavior in 
non-conforming tax planning activities that generate a difference between book and taxable 
income; thus, cross-sectional variation in total BTD may not fully indicate tax aggressiveness 
across firms with varying financial reporting incentives. In my setting, I use the difference in 
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book-tax difference between the acquirer and target as a proxy for tax aggressiveness transfer. 
This measure may be biased if the acquirers engage in earnings management prior to the 
completion of stock-for-stock acquisitions to boost their stock prices (Erickson and Wang 1999). 
To mitigate the potential bias of my tax aggressiveness transfer measure, I measure BTD one 
year prior to the announcement of the deal. Although I do not expect the financial reporting 
incentives to vary significantly and systematically across the particular acquirer-target pairs one 
year prior to the merger transaction, I use three additional measures of tax aggressiveness to 
provide triangulating evidence to support my research question. I discuss each measure below.  
The second proxy for tax aggressiveness is a measure of abnormal BTD (ABTD), a 
residual-based BTD measure obtained from a fixed-effect regression of total BTD on a measure 
of earnings management. I use the discretionary accruals estimated from the modified Jones 
model by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) to measure earnings management.
2
 Specifically, 
abnormal BTD (ABTD) is the residuals (εi,t) from the following regression: 
  
BTDi,t = βDAi,t + μi + εi,t 
 
(4) 
 
where BTD is total book-tax difference as defined above. DA is discretionary accruals 
estimated from the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995). 
 
 
 
The third measure I employ is based on the DTAX measure advanced by Frank et al. 
(2009). It is another residual-based BTD measure obtained from a regression of permanent BTD 
or ETR differentials (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) on known determinants such as intangible 
assets, minority interests, and income from unconsolidated subsidiaries. A firm’s foreign 
operations may contribute to higher ETR differentials for the firm (Rego, 2003), but having these 
foreign operations does not necessarily indicate that the acquirer is more tax aggressive than the 
                                                     
2
 Results are very similar using alternative proxies for earnings management (e.g., total accruals, Jones, 1991; 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005). 
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target. To alleviate the concern that our measure of tax aggressiveness transfer may be affected 
by cross-sectional differences in foreign operations between the merging parties, I modify the 
DTAX measure by controlling for a firm’s foreign operations. Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 
(2012) make a similar adjustment to their DTAX measure. Specifically, the DTAX measure based 
on Frank et al. (2009) is the residuals (εi,t) from the following regression: 
  
PERMDIFF i,t = α0 + α1 INTANGi,t + α2 UNCONi,t + α3 MIi,t + α4 CSTEi,t 
                                    + α5 ∆NOLi,t + α6 PERMDIFFi,t-1 + α7 FOREIGNi,t + εi,t 
 
(5) 
 
where  
PERMDIFF = [(Pre-tax income – taxable income) – (deferred tax expense/statutory tax rate)],  
INTANG is goodwill and other intangibles,  
UNCON is income (loss) reported under the equity method,  
MI is income (loss) from minority interest,  
CSTE is current state income tax expense,  
∆NOL is change in net operating loss carry-forwards,  
FOREIGN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has foreign income, and 0 otherwise. 
PERMDIFF, INTANG, UNCON, CSTE, and ∆NOL are all scaled by lagged assets. 
 
 
The last measure of tax aggressive is Dyreng et al.’s (2008) long-run cash effective tax 
rate (CASHETR5). One benefit of using cash taxes is that this measure avoids the problem of 
overstated current tax expense due to differential book-tax treatment of employee stock option 
deductions (Dyreng et al. 2008). The five-year cash effective tax rate based on Dyreng et al. 
(2008) is defined as follows: 
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where the numerator is the sum of cash tax paid over a five-year period before the merger and 
the denominator is the sum of pre-tax income over the same period.  
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Similar to my D_BTD measure, I measure tax aggressiveness transfer by computing the 
difference in tax aggressiveness between acquirer i and target j one year ahead of the merger 
announcement: 
 D_ABTDi,j,t-1 = ABTDi,t-1 – ABTDj,t-1 (7a)  
 D_DTAX,j,t-1 = DTAXi,t-1 – DTAXj,t-1 (7b)  
 D_CETRi,j,t-1 = CASHETR5i,t-1 – CASHETR5j,t-1 (7c) 
While extent research suggests that taxes play an important role in cross-border M&A 
(e.g., Arulampalam, Devereux, Liberini 2012; Huizinga and Voget 2009; Mescall and Klassen 
2013), the focus of this study is on U.S. transactions for research design reasons. The 
construction of the dependent variable requires consistent measures of the acquirer’s and the 
target’s tax aggressiveness. In the context of cross-border transactions, constructing a reliable 
measure of tax aggressiveness transfer for a U.S. acquirer and a foreign target would be a 
challenging task as differences in tax laws and accounting standards between the U.S. and the 
foreign country may adversely affect the validity of the measure. 
3.3.4 Regression Specifications 
To test my hypotheses H1 and H2, I run the following regression model: 
  
      PCAR = α + β1 D_BTD_POS + β2 D_BTD_NEG + X’ζ + t + ε (8)  
  
  
The main dependent variable, PCAR, is the abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio 
of the acquirer and the target, and D_BTD is the difference in total BTD between the merging 
firms. I break down D_BTD into two variables based on the sign of the values. That is, 
D_BTD_POS (D_BTD_NEG) measures the level of tax aggressiveness transfer for transactions 
in which the acquirer (target) is more aggressive than the target (acquirer) is. I expect β1 to be 
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positive in Equation (8) to be consistent with hypothesis H1 that increases in targets’ tax 
aggressiveness are associated with higher acquisition gains. Similarly, I also expect β2 to be 
positive to be consistent with hypothesis H2 that decreases in targets’ tax aggressiveness are 
associated with lower acquisition gains. X is a vector of firm-specific and deal-specific 
observable determinants of acquisition gains, and t is calendar year fixed-effects. 
Following existing research on M&A (e.g., Travlos 1987; Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz 2004; and Wang and Xie 2008), I control for three categories of determinants of acquisition 
gains in Equation (8): target, acquirer, and deal characteristics. For firm characteristics, I control 
for the target’s and acquirer’s firm size (SIZE), Tobin’s q (TOBINSQ), profitability (ROA), and 
leverage (LEV), all measured at the fiscal year end prior to the merger announcement. I expect 
portfolio abnormal returns to be negatively associated with acquirer size, consistent with Moeller 
et al.’s (2004) findings. Prior studies (Lang et al. 1989; Servaes 1991) show that, for acquisitions 
of public targets, announcement abnormal returns are higher when acquirers have high Tobin’s q 
and targets have low Tobin’s q. However, Moeller et al. (2004) provide evidence that acquirer 
return is negatively related to the acquirer’s Tobin’s q. Given the mixed findings documented in 
existing literature, I make no directional prediction on the coefficient on the acquirer’s Tobin’s q. 
Wang and Xie (2008) find that abnormal returns are positively associated with acquirers’ and 
targets’ profitability. Thus, I control for profitability by including returns on assets (ROA) in the 
return regression. Finally, I expect acquirer leverage to be positively associated with acquirer 
returns and negatively associated with target returns, consistent with the findings in Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2005). 
For deal characteristics, I include relative deal size (DEALRATIO) and indicator variables 
for whether the deal is a tender offer (TENDER), a stock-financed transaction (ALLSTOCK), a 
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high-tech merger (HIGHTECH), or a within-industry merger (INDMATCH). In light of prior 
literature which finds that tender offers generate higher gains (e.g., Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer, 
and Noah 2005), I expect TENDER to be positively associated with abnormal returns. To control 
for the possibility that the method of financing can provide signals that affect abnormal returns 
(Myers and Majluf 1984), I include an indicator variable for stock-for-stock transactions 
(ALLSTOCK). Consistent with the empirical findings by Travlos (1987), I expect stock-for-stock 
transactions to generate negative abnormal returns. Moeller et al. (2004) find a positive 
association between acquirer returns and relative deal size, although a negative association is 
observed in a subsample of large acquirers. Following Moeller et al. (2004), I control for the 
relative deal size (DEALRATIO), defined as the ratio of total consideration paid (excluding fees) 
to the acquirer’s market value of equity. I do not have an ex ante prediction regarding the sign of 
DEALRATIO. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and Wang and Xie (2008) find that high-tech 
mergers are negatively associated with abnormal returns, suggesting that acquirers are more 
likely to underestimate the costs but to overestimate the synergies in high-tech combinations. 
Therefore, I also include a dummy variable HIGHTECH to indicate whether the transaction is a 
merger between firms in the high-technology industries. Finally, following Wang and Xie 
(2008), I include a dummy variable INDMATCH to control for the potential higher synergies 
related to economies of scale in a merger between firms in related industries.  
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The variables used in Equation (8) are defined as follows: 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of outstanding equity. 
 
TOBINSQ = Market value of assets over book value of assets, where the market 
value of assets is   computed as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock less the sum of the book value of common 
stock. 
 
ROA = Pre-tax income, scaled by lagged assets. 
 
LEV = Book value of debts, scaled by lagged assets. 
 
TENDER = Indicator variable: 1 for tender offer, and 0 otherwise. 
 
ALLSTOCK = Indicator variable: 1 for 100% stock-financed deal, and 0 otherwise. 
 
DEALRATIO = The total deal value (sum of all considerations paid, excluding fees) 
divided by the acquirer's pre-announcement market value of equity; 
market value of equity is defined as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the stock price at the 6
th
 trading day prior to the merger 
announcement date. 
 
HIGHTECH = Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target are both in a high-technology 
industry, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Following the classification scheme in Kimbrough and Louis (2011), 
high-tech industries are as those in SIC codes 2833-2836 
(Pharmaceuticals), 3570-3577 (Computers), 3600-3674 (Electronics), 
7371-7379 (Programming), or 8731-8734 (R&D Services). 
 
INDMATCH = Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target share a 2-digit SIC industry, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.3.5 Sample Selection 
I draw the sample from the SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions database. I only 
consider M&A transactions involving publicly-traded U.S. target and acquiring firms so that the 
firms’ stock return and financial statement data are available from CRSP and Compustat. To 
ensure that my sample only includes deals that result in changes in control, I include only deals 
in which the acquirer owns less than 50% of the shares of the target prior to the merger 
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announcement and 100% of the target after the acquisition. I exclude transactions with deal 
values lower than $1 million. I also exclude firms in the financial sector (SIC 6000 – 6999) due 
to its unique nature of regulatory environment and data requirements. I identify 844 completed 
M&A transactions announced between January 1, 1990 and December 31 2010.  
3.3.6 Section Summary 
In this section, I discuss the empirical model for testing the two hypotheses outlined in 
Section 3.2. I first describe how I measure acquisition gains and tax aggressiveness transfer. 
Then, I specify the empirical model used to test my hypotheses. The next section presents 
estimation results of the model using the sample specified. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Introduction 
This section presents and discusses the results from the estimation of the empirical model 
specified in Equation (8). Section 3.4.2 presents the descriptive statistics relevant to my tests of 
hypotheses H1 and H2. The presentation also includes a review of a correlation table for my 
variables of interest as well as control variables. Section 3.4.3 discusses the main results for my 
tests of hypotheses H1 and H2. Estimation results for the main test as well as additional tests 
using alternative measures of tax aggressiveness are reported in Table 3.4.3 Panels A to E. 
Section 3.4.4 concludes the section. 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for my sample. The mean 
(median) difference between acquirers’ and targets’ BTD is 0.03 (0.01). These differences 
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between acquirers’ and targets’ tax aggressiveness also present in the abnormal book-tax 
difference (ABTD) and in the discretionary book-tax difference (DTAX) measures. On average, 
the acquirers’ cash effective tax rate (CASHETR5) is 2.1 percentage points lower than the 
target’s CASHETR5. All the differences are statistically significant at the 5% level (one-tailed 
test). Overall, the statistics suggest that acquirers are slightly more tax aggressive than targets are 
in my sample. Note that the mean BTD for acquirers and the mean BTD for targets are negative 
due to the presence of firms with negative pre-tax income in my sample. Across distribution, the 
values of total BTD are slightly smaller than those reported in extent studies (e.g. Chen et al. 
2010), but they become comparable once the loss firms have been removed. In contrast, the 
values of other tax aggressiveness proxies (i.e., ABTD, DTAX, and CASHETR5) indicate that my 
sample firms are slightly more tax aggressive than those in other studies (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; 
Dyreng et al. 2008; Frank et al. 2009).  
Panel A of Table 3.4.2 also presents characteristics of the acquirers, the targets, and the 
transactions. In terms of firm size, the mean (median) market capitalization for acquirers and for 
targets is $10.5 ($1.3) billion and $1.1 ($0.16) billion respectively. The mean (median) total deal 
value is about 49 (24) percent of the market capitalization of the acquirers. 
Turning to the performance measures, the mean (median) portfolio CAR (PCAR) is 2.1 
(1.3) percent, a figure that is consistent with prior research (e.g. Moeller et al. 2004; Wang and 
Xie 2008). On average, the acquirers earn a negative abnormal return of -0.8 percent (ACAR), 
whereas the targets earn a positive abnormal return of 24.5 percent (TCAR). These findings are 
consistent with the findings in Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) that abnormal stock returns 
are negative for acquirer shareholders and are positive for target shareholders in acquisitions of 
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public targets. PCAR and TCAR are significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and ACAR 
is significant at the 5% level.  
Correlations among the main variables are reported in Table 3.4.2 Panel B. The 
correlations indicate that D_BTD, D_ABTD, and D_DTAX are positively related to all return 
variables (PCAR, ACAR, and TCAR). D_CETR is negatively correlated with PCAR only. 
Reported in Table 3.4.2 Panel C, the correlations among the control variables indicate that some 
firm-level characteristics such as firm size, leverage, and return on assets are highly correlated 
between the acquirers and targets. To ensure that multicollinearity is not a problem in my 
regressions, I examine the variance inflation factors (VIF). VIF values are less than 4 in all 
regressions, suggesting that multicollinearity does not negatively impact the results. 
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Table 3.4.2 – Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Q1 Median Q3  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Tax Aggressiveness 
Measures 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BTD Acquirer 844 -0.068 0.192 -0.069 -0.013 0.022  
BTD Target 844 -0.092 0.218 -0.135 -0.027 0.016  
D_BTD (Acquirer – Target) 844 0.030 0.235 -0.038 0.009 0.092  
   
 
 
 
 
 
ABTD Acquirer 844 0.081 0.196 0.073 0.130 0.164  
ABTD Target 844 0.045 0.242 0.023 0.117 0.165  
D_ABTD (Acquirer – Target) 844 0.036 0.246 -0.045 0.008 0.087  
   
 
 
 
 
 
DTAX Acquirer 844 0.018 0.412 -0.032 0.044 0.091  
DTAX Target 844 0.011 0.285 -0.017 0.045 0.087  
D_DTAX (Acquirer – Target) 844 0.032 0.249 -0.065 0.000 0.068  
   
 
 
 
 
 
CASHETR5 Acquirer 594 0.263 0.144 0.175 0.260 0.333  
CASHETR5 Target 594 0.284 0.205 0.148 0.272 0.357  
D_CETR (Acquirer – Target) 594 -0.021 0.222 -0.103 0.000 0.084  
   
 
 
 
 
 
BTD Acquirer [PI ≥ 0] 496 -0.003 0.081 -0.035 0.001 0.033  
BTD Target [PI ≥ 0] 496 0.006 0.104 -0.028 0.004 0.036  
D_BTD (Acquirer – Target) [PI ≥ 0] 496 -0.009 0.122 -0.044 0.000 0.038  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Acquirer Characteristics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Total Assets [MM] 844 6,133 16,936 224.7 892.2 3,772  
Market Value [MM] 844 10,454 28,274 351.7 1,336 5,570  
ROA 844 0.113 0.181 0.078 0.138 0.202  
TOBINSQ 844 2.968 4.917 1.353 1.921 3.073  
LEV 844 0.197 0.201 0.023 0.161 0.310  
G-INDEX 445 9.127 2.716 7.000 9.000 11.00  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Target Characteristics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Total Assets [MM] 844 1,287 10,290 51.05 127.0 436.1  
Market Value [MM] 844 1,120 4,884 53.81 161.5 549.8  
ROA 844 0.034 0.261 0.006 0.104 0.159  
TOBINSQ 844 2.250 2.628 1.641 1.574 2.374  
LEV 844 0.202 0.261 0.005 0.110 0.331  
   
 
 
 
 
 
Deal Characteristics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
PCAR (%) 844 2.096 9.892 -2.544 1.326 6.449  
ACAR (%) 844 -0.831 10.60 -5.373 -0.659 3.564  
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TCAR (%) 844 24.48 27.25 7.506 20.10 35.33  
TENDER (dummy) 844 0.236 0.434 0.000 0.000 1.000  
ALLSTOCK (dummy) 844 0.336 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000  
DEALRATIO 844 0.489 0.869 0.075 0.241 0.576  
HIGHTECH (dummy) 844 0.362 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000  
INDMATCH (dummy) 844 0.679 0.467 0.000 1.000 1.000  
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample.  
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Table 3.4.2 – Panel B 
Correlation Matrix for Test Variables 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) PCAR  
 
     
(2) ACAR  0.85      
(3) TCAR  0.33 0.16     
(4) D_BTD Acquirer – Target 0.07 0.13 0.13    
(5) D_ABTD Acquirer – Target 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.85   
(6) D_DTAX Acquirer – Target 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.68 0.64  
(7) D_CETR Acquirer – Target -0.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.16 -0.19 -0.03 
   
     
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the return and tax aggressiveness 
transfer variables. The coefficients in bold are all statistically significant at less than the 10% 
level in two-tailed tests.  
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Table 3.4.2 – Panel C 
Correlation Matrix for Control Variables 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  
(1) SIZE Acquirer               
(2) TOBINSQ Acquirer  0.15             
(3) LEV Acquirer  -0.13 -0.23            
(4) ROA Acquirer  0.33 -0.16 0.03           
(5) SIZE Target  0.60 0.09 0.04 0.15          
(6) TOBINSQ Target  0.16 0.51 -0.18 -0.22 0.22         
(7) LEV Target  -0.11 -0.18 0.55 0.05 -0.05 -0.24        
(8) ROA Target  0.08 -0.17 0.18 0.45 0.29 -0.23 0.16       
(9) TENDER  0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.14 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.04      
(10) ALLSTOCK  -0.13 0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.06 0.19 -0.14 -0.11 -0.36     
(11) DEALRATIO  -0.32 -0.04 0.17 -0.23 0.10 -0.02 0.14 0.08 -0.04 -0.01    
(12) HIGHTECH  0.09 0.09 -0.27 -0.03 0.00 0.17 -0.28 -0.11 -0.04 0.11 -0.08   
(13) INDMATCH  -0.09 0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.21  
  
              
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the control variables. The coefficients in bold are all statistically significant at less than the 10% level in 
two-tailed tests.  
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3.4.3 Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains 
Panel A of Table 3.4.3 presents the results of estimating Equation (8). For PCAR 
regression, the coefficient on D_BTD_POS is not statistically different from zero, whereas the 
coefficient on D_BTD_NEG is positive and significant. Tests of equality of coefficients confirm 
the significant difference between the two regression coefficients. These results suggest that 
acquisitions of more tax aggressive targets by less tax aggressive acquirers are value-destroying, 
and that the shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer are driven by decreases in 
targets’ tax aggressiveness. To gauge the economic significance of the estimates, consider a less 
tax aggressive acquirer (BTD = -0.069 at the first quartile) acquires a more tax aggressive target 
(BTD = 0.016 at the third quartile). This hypothetical transaction would yield an abnormal return 
of -0.743 percent. 
Similar results are found for ACAR regression, where the coefficient on D_BTD_NEG is 
significantly positive but the coefficient on D_BTD_POS is not significant. The coefficients on 
D_BTD_POS and D_BTD_NEG are both insignificant in TCAR regression. These results suggest 
that the value-destroying effect is accrued to the shareholders of the acquirers but not to those of 
the targets. Overall, the results support hypothesis H2 that acquisitions of more tax aggressive 
targets by less tax aggressive acquirers generate lower acquisition gains, but do not support 
hypothesis H1. 
To provide triangulating evidence, I estimate Equation (8) with alternative measures of 
tax aggressiveness, namely, abnormal book-tax difference (ABTD), discretionary book-tax 
difference (DTAX), and cash effective tax rate (CASHETR5). The results are reported in Panel B 
to D of Table 3.4.3, respectively. As reported in Panels B and C of Table 3.4.3, the results using 
ABTD and DTAX to measure tax aggressiveness are very similar. In particular, in both PCAR 
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regressions, the coefficients on D_ABTD_POS (D_ABTD_NEG) and D_DTAX_POS 
(D_DTAX_NEG) are all positive and significant, suggesting that acquisition of less (more) tax 
aggressive targets by (more) less tax aggressive acquirers generate significant (higher) lower 
acquisition gains. These results provide empirical support for both hypotheses H1 and H2.  
In terms of economic significance, for example, a hypothetical transaction in which a 
more tax aggressive acquirer (ABTD = 0.164 at the third quartile) acquires a less tax aggressive 
target (ABTD = 0.023 at the first quartile) would have an abnormal return of 0.724 percent; 
similarly, a hypothetical acquisition in which a less tax aggressive acquirer (ABTD = 0.073 at the 
first quartile) acquires a more tax aggressive target (ABTD = 0.165 at the third quartile) would 
have an abnormal return of -0.994 percent. 
Turning to the results of ACAR regressions in Table 3.4.3, the coefficients on the positive 
tax aggressiveness transfer variables (D_ABTD_POS and D_DTAX_POS) are not significant. 
The coefficients on the negative tax aggressiveness transfer variables (D_ABTD_NEG and 
D_DTAX_NEG), however, are significantly positive. These results suggest that the value-
destroying effect of negative tax aggressiveness transfer is levied on the acquirer shareholders 
only, consistent with the results documented earlier in Panel A of Table 3.4.3 using BTD as the 
tax aggressiveness measure.  
Interestingly, TCAR and ACAR regressions yield some asymmetric results. Specifically, 
as reported in Panels B and C of Table 3.4.3, the coefficients on the positive tax aggressiveness 
transfer variables (D_ABTD_POS and D_DTAX_POS) are significant in both TCAR regressions, 
whereas the coefficients on the negative tax aggressiveness transfer variables (D_ABTD_NEG 
and D_DTAX_NEG) are not significantly positive. These results are opposite to those of ACAR 
regressions. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that the value-destroying effect of negative tax 
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aggressiveness transfer is accrued to the target shareholders, while the value-enhancing effect of 
positive tax aggressiveness transfer is captured by the target shareholders. These asymmetric 
results are consistent with the findings in prior literature that suggest the gains from corporate 
acquisitions are mainly captured by shareholders of the targets rather than by those of the 
acquirers (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988). 
 Panel D of Table 3.4.3 reports the results using CASHETR5 as the tax aggressiveness 
measure. For all regressions, the coefficients on D_CETR_POS are in the correct sign (negative) 
but are not statistically significant. Also, contrary to my predictions in hypothesis H2, the 
coefficients on D_CETR_NEG are both negative and significant in the PCAR and ACAR 
regressions. This result implies that acquisitions of less tax aggressive targets by more tax 
aggressive acquirers yield lower acquisition gains. Because CASHETR5 exhibits significant 
cross-industry variation (Dyreng et al. 2008), our measure D_CETR may capture features of tax 
function of the acquirers that are non-transferrable such as industry-specific tax attributes (oil 
and gas extraction industry) or the extent of foreign operations. To ensure that this inconsistent 
result is not related to the differences in industry environment, I conduct two specification 
checks. First, I compute industry-mean-adjusted cash effective tax rates by subtracting the 
industry mean CASHETR5 from each firm’s CASHETR5. I then use the industry-mean-adjusted 
CASHETR5 to compute D_CETR_POS and D_CETR_NEG and re-estimate Equation (8). 
Reported in Panel E of Table 3.4.3, the results using industry-mean-adjusted CASHETR5 are 
similar to those using unadjusted CASHETR5. Second, I include acquirer industry fixed effects 
based on the acquirer’s two-digit SIC code to control for any industry-wide variation. 
Untabulated results indicate that the coefficient on D_CETR_NEG remains significantly positive, 
suggesting that the inconsistent results are not due to the cross-industry variation in CASHETR5. 
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In sum, the results using CASHETR5 as the tax aggressiveness measure are not consistent with 
hypothesis H2. I will revisit these inconsistent results in Section 3.5.2. 
 
 
 
  
 47 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4.3 – Panel A 
The Association between Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
     
 
 
Pred. Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR  
     
 
 D_BTD_POS + 2.195 1.879 6.507  
  
(0.798) (0.656) (0.997)  
 D_BTD_NEG +       8.741***       9.171*** 5.792  
  
(2.628) (2.601) (0.816)  
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
      -1.007*** -0.269       4.700***  
  
(-4.038) (-0.979) (6.552)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
0.031 0.023 0.091  
  
(0.463) (0.298) (0.732)  
 ROA 
 
-2.036 -1.793 -0.989  
  
(-0.546) (-0.533) (-0.130)  
 LEV 
 
1.426     4.726** -9.304  
  
(0.798) (2.329) (-1.559)  
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
-0.271     -0.567**       -6.483***  
  
(-1.063) (-1.991) (-7.758)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
      -0.608***       -0.488***       -0.863***  
  
(-3.291) (-2.723) (-2.788)  
 ROA 
 
1.028 -0.525 0.866  
  
(0.357) (-0.173) (0.155)  
 LEV 
 
  -2.389*  -2.234* 2.534  
  
(-1.936) (-1.667) (0.455)  
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
    2.082**     1.827**     4.610**  
  
(2.478) (2.003) (1.967)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-0.698 -1.139 -3.054  
  
(-0.821) (-1.178) (-1.480)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
      1.173*** -0.292    1.640**  
  
(2.821) (-0.405) (2.145)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
0.297 -0.669 -1.241  
  
(0.385) (-0.779) (-0.666)  
 IND_MATCH 
 
-0.779 -1.133 0.390  
  
(-1.171) (-1.542) (0.201)  
Intercept 
 
      15.75***       9.529***       29.03***  
  
(6.030) (3.559) (4.417)  
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.174 0.128 0.192  
     N 
 
844 844 844  
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year fixed-
effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for main independent 
variables, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4.3 – Panel B 
The Association between Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
     
 
 
Pred. Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR  
     
 
 D_ABTD_POS +   5.132* 3.394     16.59**  
  
(1.497) (0.990) (1.672)  
 D_ABTD_NEG +       10.80***       11.47*** 7.061  
  
(2.809) (2.855) (0.938)  
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
      -0.914*** -0.148       4.804***  
  
(-3.654) (-0.544) (6.726)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.066 -0.076 -0.003  
  
(-0.573) (-0.519) (-0.012)  
 ROA 
 
-3.666 -3.110 -7.006  
  
(-0.980) (-0.888) (-0.727)  
 LEV 
 
0.385 2.715 -5.470  
  
(0.204) (1.278) (-0.869)  
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
-0.401     -0.779**       -6.439***  
  
(-1.458) (-2.581) (-7.588)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
      -0.502***     -0.366**     -0.874**  
  
(-2.605) (-2.000) (-2.214)  
 ROA 
 
3.617 1.377 5.686  
  
(1.147) (0.427) (0.879)  
 LEV 
 
-1.913* -1.169 0.230  
  
(-1.685) (-0.935) (0.045)  
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
    1.898**   1.517*     5.620**  
  
(2.341) (1.746) (2.399)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-0.740   -1.516* -0.739  
  
(-0.901) (-1.658) (-0.328)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
      1.143*** -0.300 1.194  
  
(2.814) (-0.554) (1.520)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
-0.816     -1.686** -2.421  
  
(-1.130) (-2.042) (-1.184)  
 IND_MATCH 
 
-0.325 -0.481 0.560  
  
(-0.489) (-0.655) (0.271)  
Intercept 
 
      15.33***       9.542***       30.78***  
  
(6.714) (4.123) (5.118)  
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.164 0.130 0.163  
     N 
 
844 844 844  
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year fixed-
effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for main independent 
variables, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4.3 – Panel C 
The Association between Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
     
 
 
Pred. Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR  
     
 
 D_DTAX_POS +   3.622* 0.517   9.527*  
  
(1.615) (0.248) (1.631)  
 D_DTAX_NEG +       7.457***   4.738* 5.734  
  
(2.595) (1.637) (0.849)  
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
      -0.966*** -0.159       4.627***  
  
(-4.402) (-0.675) (6.790)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
0.047 0.018 0.206  
  
(0.351) (0.119) (0.651)  
 ROA 
 
-1.848 -1.389 -2.121  
  
(-0.536) (-0.456) (-0.245)  
 LEV 
 
1.304 2.863 -2.608  
  
(0.750) (1.488) (-0.464)  
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
-0.267     -0.617**       -5.919***  
  
(-1.174) (-2.469) (-8.242)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.326 -0.075 -0.566  
  
(-1.133) (-0.290) (-0.908)  
 ROA 
 
2.826 -0.522 3.788  
  
(1.287) (-0.224) (0.717)  
 LEV 
 
    -2.971** -1.594 -2.268  
  
(-2.136) (-1.029) (-0.500)  
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
    1.721**     1.731**       5.764***  
  
(2.456) (2.299) (2.630)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
    -1.579**     -1.770** -2.834  
  
(-2.174) (-2.248) (-1.389)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
      1.208*** -0.357     1.694**  
  
(3.360) (-0.624) (2.272)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
-0.742     -1.534**   -3.571*  
  
(-1.214) (-2.237) (-1.813)  
 IND_MATCH 
 
0.356 0.157 1.537  
  
(0.589) (0.251) (0.816)  
Intercept 
 
      13.10***       6.517***       31.70***  
  
(6.386) (3.189) (5.459)  
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.135 0.075 0.149  
     N 
 
844 844 844  
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year fixed-
effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for main independent 
variables, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4.3 – Panel D 
The Association between Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
     
 
 
Pred. Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR  
     
 
 D_CETR_POS – -2.451 -3.069 -2.315  
  
(-0.836) (-1.102) (-0.325)  
 D_ CETR_NEG – 3.654 3.737 3.063  
  
(1.966) (1.628) (0.561)  
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
      -1.317*** -0.282       3.321***  
  
(-4.647) (-0.933) (3.686)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.062 0.126 -0.190  
  
(-0.178) (0.351) (-0.209)  
 ROA 
 
2.374 0.390 25.73  
  
(0.485) (0.073) (1.548)  
 LEV 
 
-1.917 -1.660 -8.849  
  
(-0.866) (-0.701) (-1.303)  
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
-0.194   -0.517*       -5.194***  
  
(-0.723) (-1.762) (-6.114)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.327 -0.423 -0.670  
  
(-0.930) (-1.003) (-0.737)  
 ROA 
 
3.850 2.923 11.007  
  
(0.810) (0.563) (0.746)  
 LEV 
 
-0.609 1.040 6.583  
  
(-0.344) (0.522) (0.870)  
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
0.895 1.098 2.335  
  
(1.294) (1.492) (0.974)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-0.979 0.177 -2.742  
  
(-1.208) (0.211) (-1.180)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
      1.530*** -0.180 1.780  
  
(2.738) (-0.220) (1.449)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
  1.312* 0.405 1.624  
  
(1.791) (0.475) (0.647)  
 IND_MATCH 
 
-0.783 -0.711 -1.869  
  
(-1.216) (-1.052) (-0.943)  
Intercept 
 
      15.25***       7.401***       28.15***  
  
(6.011) (2.735) (3.806)  
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.209 0.073 0.171  
     N 
 
594 594 594  
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year fixed-
effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for main independent 
variables, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.4.3 – Panel E 
The Association between Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
(Industry-Mean-Adjusted Cash ETR) 
     
 
 
Pred. Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR  
     
 
 D_CETR_POS – -2.164 -2.709 -1.631  
  
(-0.737) (-0.970) (-0.230)  
 D_ CETR_NEG – 3.575 3.585 3.126  
  
(1.917) (1.558) (0.584)  
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
      -1.319*** -0.284       3.321***  
  
(-4.646) (-0.937) (3.683)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.063 0.124 -0.189  
  
(-0.181) (0.346) (-0.208)  
 ROA 
 
2.459 0.496 25.871  
  
(0.502) (0.093) (1.558)  
 LEV 
 
-1.861 -1.600 -8.779  
  
(-0.842) (-0.677) (-1.295)  
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
-0.195   -0.517*       -5.197***  
  
(-0.724) (-1.758) (-6.111)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.325 -0.421 -0.671  
  
(-0.924) (-0.996) (-0.737)  
 ROA 
 
3.843 2.928 10.938  
  
(0.810) (0.564) (0.742)  
 LEV 
 
-0.605 1.042 6.598  
  
(-0.342) (0.523) (0.872)  
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
0.903 1.108 2.342  
  
(1.307) (1.506) (0.978)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-0.975 0.181 -2.740  
  
(-1.202) (0.215) (-1.180)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
      1.531*** -0.180 1.784  
  
(2.734) (-0.219) (1.450)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
1.315* 0.405 1.634  
  
(1.793) (0.475) (0.651)  
 IND_MATCH 
 
-0.785 -0.713 -1.872  
  
(-1.219) (-1.055) (-0.945)  
Intercept 
 
      15.21***       7.339***       28.09***  
  
(6.004) (2.713) (3.811)  
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.209 0.072 0.171  
     N 
 
594 594 594  
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year fixed-
effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for main independent 
variables, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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3.4.4 Section Summary 
In this section, I document strong empirical evidence that support hypothesis H2. 
Acquisitions of more tax aggressive targets by less tax aggressive acquirers generate lower 
acquisition gains. However, the evidence is weaker for hypothesis H1. Thus, results suggest that 
the association between tax aggressiveness transfer and shareholder wealth is predominately 
driven by the value-destroying effect of negative tax aggressiveness transfer. In addition, the 
results suggest that value-destroying effect is mainly levied on the shareholders of the acquirers 
rather than on those of the targets. The results are fairly consistent across various measures of tax 
aggressiveness. 
3.5 Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks 
3.5.1 Introduction 
This section provides the results from performing a series of additional analysis and 
robustness checks on the main results reported in Section 3.4. Section 3.5.2 considers the 
acquirer’s corporate governance as a determinant of the association between tax aggressiveness 
transfer and shareholder wealth, proposes a research design that incorporates the acquirer’s 
governance in the baseline model of Equation (8), and discusses the results of the new regression 
model. Section 3.5.3 reports and discusses the estimation results of Equation (8) based on a 
subsample of firms with non-negative pre-tax income. Section 3.5.4 concludes the section. 
3.5.2 The Role of the Acquirer’s Corporate Governance 
Prior research suggests that the strength of corporate governance determines the 
association between tax aggressiveness and firm value (Desai et al., 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 
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2008; 2009; Wilson 2009). If aggressive tax planning is a tool for creating value in well-
governed firms only, the observed associations between tax aggressiveness transfer and 
acquisition gains could be largely determined by the acquirer’s corporate governance. To test this 
idea, I include an indicator variable of well-governed acquirers and its interaction with my tax 
aggressiveness transfer measures in the regressions. Following Wang and Xie (2008), I employ 
Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-Index to measure the acquirer’s governance strength.  
Gompers et al. (2003) construct the G-Index based on 24 anti-takeover provisions that 
capture firms’ shareholder rights, published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC). Firms with many anti-takeover provisions are viewed as having weak corporate 
governance because it is difficult and costly for their shareholders to remove managers at those 
firms. I obtain the data for Gompers et al.’s (2003) G-Index from Andrew Metrick’s website.3 
The data period is between 1990 and 2009, based on IRRC publications in years 1990, 1993, 
1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. Following the method of Gompers et al. (2003), I 
assume that firms have the same governance provisions as they did in the previous publication 
year during the gap between each publication. I do not use the 2008 vintage of RiskMetrics 
governance data because it is not comparable with the data in the earlier IRRC publications 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2012). Therefore, for constructing the G-Index between 2006 and 
2009, I assume that the governance provisions remain unchanged from the last (2006) IRRC 
volume until 2009. Since IRRC covers large firms (e.g., firms included in the S&P 500 index or 
the corporation lists published by Fortune, Forbes, and BusinessWeek), the sample size is 
reduced to 445 M&A transactions after excluding acquirers that were not covered by IRRC. 
To test whether acquirer corporate governance is a determinant of the associations 
observed in my previous findings, I estimate the following regression model: 
                                                     
3
 http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html 
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              PCAR = α + β1 D_BTD_POS + β2 D_BTD_NEG  
                  + β3 GOV + β4 D_BTD_POS×GOV + β5 D_BTD_NEG×GOV + X’ζ + t + ε 
(9) 
  
where PCAR is the abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target, 
D_BTD_POS (D_BTD_NEG) is my proxy for positive (negative) tax aggressiveness transfer, 
GOV is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer is well-governed. I define an acquirer 
as well-governed if it has a below-median G-Index in the sample. I interact GOV with each of 
D_BTD_POS and D_BTD_NEG to examine whether the acquirer’s governance affects the 
associations between tax aggressiveness transfer and acquisition gains. If the shareholder wealth 
effects are significantly stronger for well-governed acquirers than for poorly-governed acquirers, 
I expect β4 and β5 to be significantly positive.  
 The estimation results of Equation (9) are presented in Panel A of Table 3.5.2 (columns 1 
to 3). In both regressions of PCAR and ACAR, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
(D_BTD_POS×GOV and D_BTD_NEG×GOV) are both significantly positive, suggesting that 
the shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer are significantly more positive for 
well-governed acquirers. Moreover, the associations between tax aggressiveness transfer and 
acquisition gains for well-governed acquirers are significantly positive (the p-values for one-
tailed tests of β1+β4 > 0 and β2+β5 > 0 are both less than 0.05 and less than 0.1 in the PCAR 
regression and ACAR regression, respectively). These results suggest that when the acquirer’s 
governance is strong, acquisitions of targets with lower tax aggressiveness by acquirers with 
higher tax aggressiveness generate significantly higher acquisition gains, and vice versa. 
Compared to the results in Panel A of 3.4.3, the results from Equation (9) portray a more 
complete picture of the relationship between tax aggressiveness transfer and shareholder wealth.  
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I find opposite results for poorly-governed acquirers; there is a negative association 
between D_BTD_NEG and acquisition gains for both PCAR and ACAR regressions. Specifically, 
these results suggest that, when the acquirers are poorly-governed, acquisitions of more tax 
aggressive targets by less tax aggressive acquirers generate higher acquisition gains. This finding 
is consistent with the interpretation that, for poorly-governed acquirers, acquirer shareholders 
consider the lack of further tax planning opportunities in the targets to be a positive event 
because tax aggressiveness is harmful for the shareholders (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2009). Taken together, the results for PCAR and ACAR are consistent with the 
agency view of tax avoidance that corporate governance is an important determinant of the 
shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer. Again, none of the tax aggressiveness 
transfer variables are significant in the TCAR regression, indicating that the shareholder wealth 
effects are accrued to acquirer shareholders but not to the target shareholders. 
Since the G-Index data is only available for large firms, the sample size is reduced 
substantially after excluding acquirers with missing G-Index data. To ensure that the results are 
not sensitive to a sample of larger firms, I re-estimate the base-line model of Equation (8) using 
the reduced sample. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.5.2 (columns 4 to 6), the estimation results 
of Equation (8) using the reduced sample are very similar to those using the full sample as shown 
in Panel A of Table 3.4.3. These findings suggest that my previous results are robust to a 
subsample of larger firms.  
 In Section 3.4.3, I present results using CASHETR5 as the tax aggressiveness measure 
and find that they are inconsistent with hypothesis H2 (as reported in Panels D and E of Table 
3.4.3). I re-examine the inconsistent results by incorporating the acquirer’s corporate governance 
into the model. Specially, I estimate Equation (9) using CASHETR5 as the tax aggressiveness 
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measure. As tabulated in Table 3.5.2 Panel B, the results show that, for acquisitions by well-
governed acquirers, the coefficients on D_CETR_POS×GOV are negative and significant in both 
PCAR and ACAR regressions, and the coefficient on D_CETR_NEG×GOV is negative and 
significant in PCAR regression. The overall effects of D_CETR_POS for well-governed 
acquirers are significantly negative in both PCAR and ACAR regressions (the p-values for one-
tailed tests of β1+β4 < 0 are less than 0.05) but the overall effects of D_CETR_NEG for well-
governed acquirers are not significantly different from zero. These results reinforce my prior 
findings that acquisitions of more tax aggressive targets by well-governed, less tax aggressive 
acquirers generate lower acquisition gains. Moreover, I find a significantly positive association 
between D_CETR_NEG and acquisition gains for poorly-governed acquirers, suggesting that 
acquisitions of less tax aggressive targets by more tax aggressive, poorly-governed acquirers are 
value-destroying. Overall, the above results suggest that the inconsistent findings with 
CASHETR5 documented earlier are potentially caused by model misspecification because the 
results become consistent once the acquirer’s corporate governance is incorporated into the 
regression model.  
All in all, my findings indicate that tax aggressiveness transfer in M&A has a valuation 
impact on acquirer shareholders and that the impact hinges on the strength of the acquirers’ 
corporate governance. Triangulating evidence using various measures of tax aggressiveness 
further supports the robustness of my previous results. 
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Table 3.5.2 – Panel A 
The Role of the Acquirer’s Governance on the Association between   
Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
     
 
 
Pred. 
Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR 
Pred. 
Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR 
     
    
 D_BTD_POS ? -0.775 0.080 -5.255 + 1.012 0.889 2.914 
  
(-0.281) (0.023) (-0.327)  (0.447) (0.347) (0.309) 
 D_BTD_NEG ? -6.448   -11.90* 21.16 +      8.158***     7.424**   17.87* 
  
(-1.320) (-2.148) (0.978)  (2.525) (2.045) (1.365) 
 D_BTD_POS × GOV +       7.638***     5.903** 18.61     
  
(2.761) (1.686) (0.996)     
 D_BTD_NEG × GOV +       15.25***       20.12*** -5.540     
  
(2.559) (2.872) (-0.237)     
Acquirer Traits 
    
    
 GOV 
 
0.111 0.312 -0.292     
  
(0.161) (0.404) (-0.107)     
 SIZE 
 
     -1.048*** -0.483       3.654***        -0.903*** -0.386       3.854*** 
  
(-3.801) (-1.443) (3.049)  (-3.662) (-1.431) (3.922) 
 TOBINSQ 
 
    0.461**     0.502** -0.029    0.359*   0.417* -0.296 
  
(2.010) (2.017) (-0.040)  (1.758) (1.715) (-0.363) 
 ROA 
 
-0.438 -1.265 1.749  -0.364 -3.620 3.576 
  
(-0.110) (-0.314) (0.123)  (-0.117) (-0.967) (0.264) 
 LEV 
 
0.193 2.941       -23.67***  -0.679 1.916       -25.42*** 
  
(0.099) (1.430) (-3.113)  (-0.384) (0.978) (-3.532) 
Target Traits 
    
    
 SIZE 
 
-0.227 -0.228       -4.741***    -0.376* -0.292       -4.860*** 
  
(-0.897) (-0.769) (-4.571)  (-1.692) (-1.142) (-5.220) 
 TOBINSQ 
 
     -0.314***     -0.288** -0.603  -0.169 -0.203 -0.434 
  
(-2.607) (-2.043) (-1.044)  (-1.119) (-1.235) (-0.718) 
 ROA 
 
2.242 0.822 -8.017  1.168 0.168 -9.523 
  
(0.888) (0.254) (-0.648)  (0.512) (0.302) (-1.027) 
 LEV 
 
    -1.914** -0.446 2.134    -1.823* -0.140 2.887 
  
(-1.992) (-0.469) (0.338)  (-1.675) (-0.339) (0.668) 
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Deal Traits 
    
    
 TENDER 
 
0.486 -0.290 4.398  0.225 -0.328 4.161 
  
(0.736) (-0.404) (1.632)  (0.346) (-0.455) (1.533) 
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-0.498 -0.294 -2.104  -0.547 -0.816 -1.590 
  
(-0.592) (-0.282) (-0.706)  (-0.762) (-1.042) (-0.528) 
 DEALRATIO 
 
  1.794*   -1.894* 3.494       2.274***     -2.098** 3.741 
  
(1.813) (-1.755) (1.247)  (2.801) (-2.354) (1.162) 
 HIGHTECH 
 
-0.521 -1.169 -1.750  -0.488     -1.530** -1.629 
  
(-0.720) (-1.502) (-0.632)  (-0.750) (-2.153) (-0.638) 
 IND_MATCH 
 
-0.755 -0.997 1.525  -0.686 -0.288 1.685 
  
(-1.170) (-1.364) (0.629)  (1.132) (-0.435) (0.704) 
Intercept 
 
      13.81***       8.050***       26.13***            11.08***      5.547***       24.56*** 
  
(5.333) (2.732) (2.621)  (6.190) (2.821) (2.581) 
     
    
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.204 0.143 0.224  0.135 0.066 0.153 
     N 
 
445 445 445  445 445 445 
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year fixed-effects are included. Reported in 
parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent 
significance levels (one-tailed for main independent variables, and two-tailed for control variables)  at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.5.2 – Panel B 
The Role of the Acquirer’s Governance on the Association between   
Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
     
 
 
Pred. 
Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR 
     
 
 D_CETR_POS ? -1.834 0.894 -10.95 
   
(-0.621) (0.295) (-1.223) 
 D_ CETR_NEG ?     5.235**   5.310* -4.552 
   
(2.462) (1.819) (-0.358) 
 D_ CETR_POS × GOV –   -6.508*     -9.018** -21.22 
   
(-1.474) (-1.870) (-1.184) 
 D_CETR_NEG × GOV – -0.594 -1.424 -11.27 
   
(-0.161) (-0.319) (-0.773) 
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 GOV 
  
0.972 0.971 2.698 
   
(1.217) (1.178) (1.066) 
 SIZE 
  
      -1.283*** -0.178     2.580** 
   
(-4.174) (-0.580) (2.367) 
 TOBINSQ 
  
0.027 0.089 -0.159 
   
(0.048) (0.170) (-0.125) 
 ROA 
  
7.368 7.314 27.045 
   
(1.116) (1.099) (1.587) 
 LEV 
  
0.671 1.923 -7.552 
   
(0.296) (0.884) (-1.016) 
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
  
-0.180 -0.320       -4.290*** 
   
(-0.606) (-1.017) (-4.442) 
 TOBINSQ 
  
-0.275 -0.376 -0.242 
   
(-0.677) (-0.826) (-0.223) 
 ROA 
  
3.890 2.301 5.095 
   
(0.757) (0.428) (0.323) 
 LEV 
  
1.537 2.419 13.782 
   
(0.806) (1.222) (1.519) 
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
  
-0.296 -0.068 4.024 
   
(-0.457) (-0.099) (1.563) 
 ALLSTOCK 
  
-1.416 0.112 -1.479 
   
(-1.500) (0.118) (-0.502) 
 DEALRATIO 
  
0.676   -1.747* 0.212 
   
(0.785) (-1.757) (0.100) 
 HIGHTECH 
  
    1.906** 0.540 2.397 
   
(2.447) (0.669) (0.808) 
 IND_MATCH 
  
  -1.249* -0.664 -2.818 
   
(-1.789) (-0.931) (-1.265) 
Intercept 
  
      14.48***   4.828*       28.37*** 
   
(5.383) (1.785) (3.061) 
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 Adjusted R
2
 
  
0.197 0.107 0.202 
     N 
  
445 445 445 
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar 
year fixed-effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent 
significance levels (one-tailed for main independent variables, and two-tailed for control variables) 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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3.5.3 Subsample of Firms with Non-Negative Pre-Tax Income 
As discussed earlier, there are some acquirers and targets with large negative pre-tax 
income in my sample; these loss firms lead to negative mean values of total BTD. Because it is 
difficult to interpret the meaning of book-tax difference for firms with negative pre-tax income, I 
exclude these loss firms and re-estimate Equation (8). As shown in Table 3.5.3, the coefficients 
on D_BTD_NEG remain significantly negative in both PCAR and ACAR regressions, suggesting 
that the results documented earlier in Panel A of Section 3.4.3 are not affected by the presence of 
loss firms in the sample. However, the positive coefficient on D_BTD_NEG becomes significant 
(at the 10% level, one-tailed test) when the loss firms are removed, implying that the presence of 
loss firms may account for to the prior insignificant relation between D_BTD_NEG and TCAR. 
Overall, I find consistent results when the loss firms are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 3.5.3 
The Association between Tax Aggressiveness Transfer and Acquisition Gains  
(Subsample of Firms with Non-Negative Pre-Tax Income) 
     
 
 
Pred. 
Sign PCAR ACAR TCAR  
     
 
 D_BTD_POS + -6.446 -5.724 9.139  
  
(-1.056) (-0.694) (0.442)  
 D_BTD_NEG +   8.020**    10.18***  15.20*  
  
(2.143) (2.418) (1.558)  
Acquirer Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
   -1.224*** -0.548    3.614***  
  
(-4.316) (-1.404) (4.202)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
0.125 0.236 0.191  
  
(1.086) (1.514) (0.454)  
 ROA 
 
  7.942**   9.683** 12.949  
  
(2.118) (2.071) (1.007)  
 LEV 
 
1.465 4.401    -12.32**  
  
(0.622) (1.578) (-2.194)  
Target Traits 
    
 
 SIZE 
 
-0.127 -0.243    -5.618***  
  
(-0.471) (-0.714) (-5.705)  
 TOBINSQ 
 
-0.117   -0.389** -0.224  
  
(-0.500) (-2.095) (-0.298)  
 ROA 
 
5.735 3.371 1.307  
  
(1.248) (0.636) (0.094)  
 LEV 
 
 -3.336*  -3.567* 3.100  
  
(-1.805) (-1.654) (0.534)  
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
  1.945**  1.703* 2.149  
  
(2.323) (1.725) (0.847)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-0.249 -0.487 -1.373  
  
(-0.289) (-0.498) (-0.560)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
   1.877*** -0.208 1.454  
  
(3.722) (-0.183) (1.369)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
-1.021 -1.328 -1.570  
  
(-1.245) (-1.503) (-0.629)  
 IND_MATCH 
 
-0.506 -0.698 0.091  
  
(-0.760) (-0.884) (0.044)  
Intercept 
 
   13.61***   7.817**    24.53***  
  
(4.297) (2.102) (3.001)  
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.225 0.115 0.171  
     N 
 
496 496 496  
     
 
This table reports regression results of acquisition gains on tax aggressiveness transfer. Calendar year 
fixed-effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels 
(one-tailed for main independent variables, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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3.5.4 Section Summary 
This section examines the role of the acquirer’s corporate governance in the association 
between tax aggressiveness transfer and shareholder wealth. The findings are consistent with the 
agency view of tax avoidance that the acquirer’s governance is a significant explanatory factor of 
the ways in which tax aggressiveness transfer affects shareholder wealth. Furthermore, I find that 
the prior inconsistent results using CASHETR5 as the tax aggressiveness measure is primarily 
due to model misspecification. I show that the results with CASHETR5 become consistent once 
the acquirer’s governance is incorporated into the model. Finally, as a robustness check, I verify 
that my earlier findings documented in Section 3.4.3 are not adversely affected by the presence 
of loss firms in the sample. 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this study, I examine the valuation effects of tax aggressiveness transfer in the context 
of M&A. Specifically, building on the assumption that the acquirer’s level of tax aggressiveness 
will apply to its target upon a successful acquisition, I test whether acquisitions of targets with 
lower tax aggressiveness by acquirers with higher tax aggressiveness generate higher acquisition 
gains, and vice versa. To test my predictions, I use the relative tax aggressiveness of the acquirer 
and the target to proxy for the extent of tax aggressiveness transfer from the acquirer to the 
target.  
Consistent with my predictions, the results suggest that acquisitions of targets with higher 
tax aggressiveness by acquirers with lower tax aggressiveness generate significantly lower 
returns, while acquisitions of less tax aggressive targets by more tax aggressive acquirers 
generate higher acquisition gains. However, the evidence is weaker in the latter direction. 
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Overall, my findings suggest that the shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer 
are driven by the value-destroying effect of decreases in tax aggressiveness. The results also 
indicate that this wealth effect of negative tax aggressiveness transfer is predominately accrued 
to acquirer shareholders rather than to target shareholders. 
Furthermore, I examine the role of the acquirer’s governance in the valuation effects of 
tax aggressiveness transfer in M&A. Consistent with extant research (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2009; Wilson 2009), I find that the acquirer’s corporate governance is a key determinant of the 
shareholder wealth effects of tax aggressiveness transfer. In particular, I find that, for well-
governed acquirers, acquisitions of targets with lower tax aggressiveness by acquirers with 
higher tax aggressiveness generate higher acquisition gains, and vice versa. My results are robust 
to the subsample of firms with non-negative pre-tax income.  
In sum, I find that the relative tax aggressiveness of the acquirer and the target affects 
shareholder wealth in M&A. This paper contributes to the body of literature that examines the 
consequences of tax avoidance by documenting a channel (i.e., M&A) through which tax 
aggressiveness can have significant impact on shareholder wealth. It also contributes to the 
M&A literature by demonstrating tax aggressiveness transfer as an underlying source of both 
gains and losses resulting from M&A. 
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Chapter 4 
Targets' Tax Sheltering Status and Shareholder Wealth  
4.1 Introduction and Contributions 
After documenting in the first study that the relative tax aggressiveness of the acquirer 
and target is a significant determinant of value creation or destruction in M&A, I take a step 
forward by examining whether acquirers price targets differently based on whether or not the 
targets have participated in tax shelters – an extreme form of tax aggressive behavior. 
Tax shelter participation is not typically publicly observable. Therefore, in this study, I 
investigate investors’ valuation of tax sheltering firms by exploring a unique situation under 
which the target’s non-sheltering status is disclosed in the Form 8-K – Agreement and Plan of 
Merger. The disclosed non-sheltering status allows the ex post public identification of targets that 
have not participated in tax shelters and therefore serves as an appropriate proxy for the target’s 
underlying tax sheltering status prior to M&A. Thus, the novel non-sheltering data presents an 
opportunity to investigate a fundamental and important question in tax research: “How do 
investors perceive corporate tax avoidance behavior?” (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
I explore two related research questions in this study. First, I examine whether acquirers 
price targets differently based on whether or not the targets have engaged in tax sheltering. While 
the target’s tax shelters may help the merged firm to generate higher after-tax income, the 
acquired tax shelters are associated with increased risk of IRS challenge, possibility of 
restatement, and reputational costs. (Mills 1998; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Graham et al. 2012; 
Hanlon, Maydew, and Saavedra 2012). Consistent with Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), who find 
that firms suffer from stock price declines when their tax sheltering activities are publicly 
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revealed, I expect that acquirers will pay a higher premium for targets that have not engaged in 
tax sheltering. 
Second, I examine whether the valuation effects of the target’s non-sheltering status are 
shared by acquirer shareholders. There are reasons to expect acquirer shareholders will favor a 
target that has not participated in tax shelters. First, knowing that the target has not engaged in 
tax sheltering could ease acquirer shareholders’ concerns regarding the target’s tax risks (Hanlon 
and Slemrod 2009). Second, the acquisition of a non-sheltering target may be viewed as an 
indication that the acquirer does not intend to divert resources from its shareholders by 
participating in tax shelters (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala, 2008). Thus, I expect that 
the target’s non-sheltering status is positively associated with acquirer abnormal returns. 
I hand-collect the target’s representation concerning its non-participation in tax shelters 
from each target’s Form 8-K – Agreement and Plan of Merger. Using the disclosed non-
sheltering status as a proxy for the target’s actual non-sheltering status, I find that the target’s 
non-sheltering status is associated with a higher takeover premium. This association remains 
positive and significant after controlling for the target’s tax aggressiveness using existing 
measures. Also, this positive association is significantly stronger for targets that are more opaque 
and for acquirers that are less tax aggressive. Moreover, I find that the association between the 
target’s non-sheltering status and acquirer returns is significantly positive for acquirers that are 
weakly governed and for targets that are more opaque. In sum, my results suggest that the 
positive valuation effect of the target’s non-participation in tax shelters is mainly captured by the 
target’s own shareholders rather than by those of the acquirer, but acquirer shareholders can 
enjoy higher acquisition gains from a non-sheltering target if the acquirer’s governance is weak 
or if the target’s information environment is not transparent. 
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To ensure the robustness of my results, I conduct two robustness checks. First, I employ 
the Heckman (1979) procedure to account for the potential endogeneity associated with the 
decision to disclose the target’s non-sheltering status. I model the disclosure decision as a 
function of acquirer, target, and deal characteristics and use this disclosure model as the first-
stage regression. The results indicate that my prior findings were not affected by selection bias. 
Second, to ensure that my prior findings were not adversely affected by potentially noisy 
observations (i.e., the potential presence of non-sheltering targets in the non-disclosing group), I 
identify targets that have a low tax sheltering probability in the non-disclosing group based on 
Wilson’s (2009) tax shelter likelihood model. The positive association between the target’s non-
sheltering status and takeover premium remains highly significant when the potentially noisy 
observations are excluded from the estimation. 
This study makes two valuable contributions to the literature. First, it documents 
evidence regarding how tax sheltering firms are priced by corporate investors. Prior literature in 
accounting and finance has examined the roles that taxes play in the pricing and structure of 
M&A by considering tax attributes of the merging firms and their shareholders (e.g., Hayn 1989; 
Erickson 1998; Erickson and Wang 2000, 2007; Ayers et al. 2003, 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 2004; 
Devos et al. 2009). Although an extensive body of research on corporate tax avoidance has 
emerged over the last several years, there is limited research about whether tax aggressiveness 
affects M&A.
4
 Recognizing this void in the literature, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) call for more 
research on whether the target’s aggressive tax positions affect acquisition price (p. 20). This 
paper responds to the call and contributes to the literature on the effects of targets’ tax attributes 
                                                     
4
 For example, see Dyreng et al. (2008, 2010), Frank et al. Rego (2009), Wilson (2009), Chen et al. (2010), Hanlon 
and Slemrod (2009), Lisowsky (2010), and Graham et al. (2012). 
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on M&A by showing that the target’s non-sheltering status has important valuation implications 
for shareholders of both the targets and acquirers. 
Second, this study proposes a new measure of tax aggressiveness to capture targets’ tax 
shelter participation in particular. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) stress that “researchers must be 
careful to consider whether the measure they choose is appropriate for their particular research 
question.” There are three distinct advantages of my measure relative to using existing measures 
of tax aggressiveness. First, the non-sheltering status data not only enables researchers to ex post 
identify targets that have not engaged in tax sheltering prior to the deal but also allows the 
research question to focus on a tax avoidance strategy that is at the most aggressive end of the 
tax avoidance continuum – tax sheltering. If a target’s tax aggressiveness has any effects on 
takeover premium, focusing on the target’s tax sheltering status would likely improve the power 
to detect such effects. Also, the non-sheltering status measure allows an empirical examination 
of the valuation effects of targets’ use of a specific class of tax shelters – reportable transactions, 
contributing to the relatively small but growing literature that examines specific tax avoidance 
strategies undertaken by firms (e.g., Engel, Erickson, and Maydew 1999; Dhaliwal and 
Newberry 2001; Lisowsky 2010; Brown 2011; and Dyreng et al. 2012). 
Second, prior research suggests that firms’ stock prices do not reflect firms’ tax sheltering 
status unless the tax shelters are publicly revealed (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). In my setting, 
prior to the public release of Form 8-K – Agreement and Plan of Merger, the target’s non-
sheltering status is unobservable by outside investors and is only privately observable by the 
acquirer via due diligence. This feature allows any identified price effect of the target’s non-
sheltering status to be reflected on the takeover premium, making the target’s non-sheltering 
status measure particularly appropriate for my research question. In contrast, existing tax 
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aggressiveness measures constructed from firms’ financial statement information are not ideal 
for this study because extant research suggests that market participants are not able to ex ante 
determine firms’ tax sheltering status from their financial statements (Hanlon 2003; McGill and 
Outslay 2004). More important, given that acquirers will be able to assess the target’s 
confidential tax returns and related working papers through M&A tax due diligence, it is unlikely 
that acquirers will rely on the limited tax information from the target’s public sources to 
determine the target’s tax sheltering status. 
Third, although tax indemnity insurance can be used by public or private firms to insure 
against penalties associated with disallowed tax positions, reportable transactions are not 
insurable due to their aggressive nature (Aon 2009; Blitz 2009; Watchorn 2009; Hartford 2011). 
In M&A, neither the target itself nor the acquirer can purchase any tax indemnity insurance 
against the tax positions related to the target’s reportable transactions. If the target’s reportable 
transactions were insurable, I may not observe a significant association between the target’s non-
sheltering status and takeover premium. In terms of research design, since tax indemnity 
insurance can be underwritten for a wide range of federal, state, and foreign tax matters 
including complex issues such as transfer pricing (Aon 2009; Hartford 2011), the availability of 
tax insurance mitigates concerns that the identified price effects are related to other forms of tax 
avoidance strategies that may be employed by the target. 
4.1.1 Background on Tax Shelters 
Tax shelters cost the U.S. Treasury tens of billions of dollars in potential tax revenue 
between 1993 and 2003 (GAO 2003). Recognizing the impact and proliferation of corporate tax 
shelters, the Treasury Department and the IRS have made an unprecedented effort over the last 
decade to combat the use of tax shelters. Such efforts include significantly increased audits of tax 
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shelter transactions, new tax shelter disclosure initiatives and regulations, and enforcement 
actions against tax shelter promoters such as banks, law firms, and accounting firms.
5
  
Recognizing that disclosure is an important mechanism to combat the growth of tax 
shelters, the IRS issued final Regulation Section 1.6011-4 – Requirement of Statement 
Disclosing Participation in Certain Transactions by Taxpayers on February 28, 2003. Regulation 
Section 1.6011 requires taxpayers to disclose their participation in “reportable transactions” on 
Form 8886 – Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement as part of their tax returns to the IRS. 
The information regarding reportable transaction involvement disclosed on this form is part of a 
firm’s tax return and is not publicly available. In 2004, the American Job Creation Act imposed 
new penalties on taxpayers who fail to disclose their participation in reportable transactions to 
the IRS. Failure to comply with the tax shelter disclosure requirement results in monetary and 
non-monetary penalties. Reportable transactions, as defined by the law, are certain transactions 
that that the IRS considers potentially abusive. Code section 6707A (e) requires taxpayers who 
file SEC Form 10-K to disclose the imposition of the penalties in Item 3 (Legal Proceedings) of 
Form 10-K. Code section 6707A (c) defines reportable transaction as a type of transaction which 
the Secretary (of State) determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion, and listed 
transaction as a transaction specifically identified by the Secretary as a tax avoidance transaction. 
Currently, there are five major categories of reportable transactions: listed transactions, 
confidential transactions, transactions with contractual protection, loss transactions, and 
transactions of interest. Transactions with a significant book-tax difference and transactions with 
a brief asset holding period are no longer reportable transactions, effective January 6, 2006 and 
                                                     
5
 In 2005, KPMG admitted that it engaged in tax shelters that generated at least $11 billion in tax losses, costing the 
U.S. government at least $2.5 billion in revenue. KPMG’s actions resulted in a penalty of $456 million and criminal 
indictment of several former KPMG tax partners. In 2010, Deutsche Bank settled with the IRS for a price of $554 
million for creating $29 billion in disallowed tax losses. In June 2012, BDO reached a settlement with the IRS and 
paid a $50 million penalty for engaging in tax shelters that resulted in $1.3 billion of evaded taxes. 
 71 
 
August 3, 2007 respectively. Each major category covers a number of specific transactions; for 
example, most of the tax shelters examined in extant studies of tax sheltering (e.g., Graham and 
Tucker 2006; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Wilson 2009), including Lease in Lease Out (LILO), 
Sale in Lease Out (SILO), Fast Pay or Step-Down Preferred Transactions, and Contested 
Liability Acceleration Strategy (CLAS), all fall under the category of listed transactions.  
This study chooses reportable transactions to represent tax shelters because the use of 
these extreme forms of tax avoidance is not uncommon and the related tax savings can be huge. 
For example, using confidential reportable transaction disclosure data from the IRS Office of 
Tax Shelter Analysis, Lisowsky et al. (2012) find that 680 firm-years, or 21 percent of their 
sample, involved at least one reportable transaction between 2006 and 2009. In terms of the 
economic significance of the tax savings, Boynton, DeFilippes, Legel, and Reum (2011) report 
that the reportable transactions of 250 firms lowered their taxable income by $29.5 billion (2.8 
percent) in 2006 and $21.4 billion (2.1 percent) in 2007. Brown (2011) estimates that the mean 
amount of IRS settlement related to Corporate-Owned Life Insurance (COLI) tax shelters is 
$50.8 million, a figure that is nearly twice that of estimated tax savings generated by those 
shelters. Likewise, Lisowsky et al. (2012) document that 48 firms used reportable transactions to 
reduce taxable income by a total of $10.7 billion (7.5 percent) in 2007. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Introduction 
This section develops testable hypotheses that build on the themes reviewed in the 
previous section. Section 4.2.2 begins by discussing the benefits and costs for firms engaging in 
tax shelters. This discussion is followed by the argument that a tax sheltering target is expected 
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to bring in higher potential costs than benefits to an acquirer. The same section also presents my 
first hypothesis related to how the takeover premium is affected by the target’s non-sheltering 
status. Based on findings in previous literature, Section 4.2.3 presents the argument that knowing 
the target’s non-sheltering status could alleviate acquirer shareholders’ concerns about the tax 
risks. Consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance, acquirer shareholders may view the 
acquisition of a non-sheltering target as an indication that the acquirer management does not 
intend to extract private benefits from its shareholders. It then follows my second hypothesis 
related to how acquirer returns are affected by the target’s non-sheltering status. All hypotheses 
are stated in the alternative form. Section 4.2.4 provides a summary of the section. 
4.2.2 Hypothesis H3: The Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium 
While tax shelters provide firms with economic benefits in the form of a lower GAAP 
effective tax rate or higher cash tax savings, or both, they also impose costs on the firms. First, 
firms incur direct costs of implementing tax shelters including consulting and planning fees paid 
to tax shelter promoters such as accounting firms and law firms. Second, in light of the 
regulatory efforts in defining and combating tax shelters in recent years, firms participating in 
these extreme forms of tax avoidance likely draw increased scrutiny from the IRS. If the 
sheltered taxes are determined to be unacceptable or disallowed by the IRS, the sheltering firms 
are required to pay additional taxes, interest, and penalties, and the firms’ financial statements 
may have to be restated (Graham et al. 2012; Hanlon et al. 2012).
6
 Third, sheltering firms may 
also suffer from negative public sentiment and reputational costs of being labeled “poor 
                                                     
6
 For example, on February 27, 2013, a federal court rejected Dow Chemical’s tax shelters that generated $1 billion 
in tax deductions. In addition to repaid taxes and interest, the court imposed 20% penalty on the chemical producer. 
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corporate citizens” when their use of tax shelters is publicly discovered (Hanlon and Slemrod 
2009; Graham et al. 2012).  
In the M&A setting, acquiring a tax sheltering target is expected to bring in higher 
potential costs than benefits to an acquirer. Although it is possible that the target’s tax shelters 
may help the acquirer to generate higher after-tax income after the deal, the acquirer would have 
participated in its own tax shelters if the acquirer had deemed them to be optimal. Given the 
increased tax risks associated with the target’s tax shelters, I expect acquirers will offer a lower 
takeover premium to targets that have participated in tax shelters. I therefore state my hypothesis 
H3 in alternative form as follows: 
H3: The target’s non-sheltering status is positively associated with takeover premium.  
It is possible that the target’s non-sheltering status is not associated with takeover 
premium. For example, if outside investors were able to identify targets that engaged in tax 
sheltering prior to the deal from other public sources (e.g., the news media), then any negative 
price effects associated with tax sheltering would have been reflected in the targets’ stock prices 
(Hanlon and Slemrod 2009) and therefore would not be reflected in the takeover premium. 
Furthermore, the agency view of tax avoidance suggests that shareholders of well-governed 
firms value tax avoidance behavior positively because managers in well-governed firms do not 
use tax shelter arrangements to facilitate rent diversion (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 
2008; Kim, Li, Zhang 2011). Consistent with this view, acquirers may not be concerned about 
the target’s tax shelters if the target is well-governed. In this case, the main effect of the target’s 
non-sheltering status on takeover premium may not be significant. 
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4.2.3 Hypothesis H4: The Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Acquirer Returns 
Hypothesis H3 examines the valuation effects of the target’s non-participation in tax 
shelters on target shareholders. But does the target’s non-sheltering status affect acquirer 
shareholder wealth? Knowing that the target has not engaged in tax sheltering could alleviate 
acquirer shareholders’ concerns about the tax risks associated with the target’s tax shelters 
(Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Graham et al. 2012; Hanlon et al. 2012). Also, acquirer shareholders 
may view the acquisition of a non-sheltering target as an indication that the acquirer management 
does not intend to extract private benefits from its shareholders, consistent with the agency view 
of tax avoidance (Desai et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 2008). Therefore, I expect that the 
acquisition gains for acquirer shareholders will be higher for targets that have not participated in 
tax shelters. Formally, my hypothesis H4, stated in alternative form, is as follows: 
H4: The target’s non-sheltering status is positively associated with acquirer returns.  
Notwithstanding the above arguments, acquirer shareholders may not capture the benefits 
of the target’s non-participation in tax shelters because prior research has shown that the gains 
from corporate acquisitions are primarily accrued to shareholders of the targets rather than to 
those of the acquirers (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter 1988). To the 
extent that the target’s non-participation in tax shelters represents a positive attribute, the 
valuation benefits associated with the target’s non-sheltering status could be mostly accrued to 
the target’s own shareholders in the form of a higher takeover premium paid by the acquirer. 
4.2.4 Section Summary 
In the M&A setting, acquiring a tax sheltering target is expected to bring in higher 
potential costs than benefits to an acquirer given the increased tax risks associated with the 
 75 
 
target’s tax shelters. Therefore, my first hypothesis predicts that acquirers will offer a lower 
takeover premium to targets that have participated in tax shelters. Knowing that the target has not 
engaged in tax sheltering could alleviate acquirer shareholders’ concerns about the tax risks 
associated with the target’s tax shelters. Also, acquirer shareholders may view the acquisition of 
a non-sheltering target as an indication that the acquirer management does not intend to extract 
private benefits from its shareholders, consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance. 
Therefore, I also hypothesize that the acquisition gains for acquirer shareholders will be higher 
for targets that have not participated in tax shelters. 
4.3 Research Design 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the research design and sample used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Section 4.2. I begin with a description of the manual coding procedure I use to 
measure the target’s non-sheltering status in Section 4.3.2. Section 4.3.3 outlines the procedure I 
use to construct the validity of my non-sheltering measure. Section 4.3.4 presents regression 
specifications to test hypotheses H3 and H4. Section 4.3.5 outlines my sample selection criteria. 
Section 4.3.6 concludes. 
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4.3.2 Measures of the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status 
I hand-collect the non-sheltering status information from each target’s Form 8-K – 
Agreement and Plan of Merger under the Representation and Warranties section. Examples of 
the non-sheltering disclosures are provided as follows: 
JAMDAT Mobile Inc., December 8, 2005 
 “The Company and each Company Subsidiary have disclosed on their federal income Tax 
returns all material positions taken therein that could, if not so disclosed, give rise to a 
substantial understatement penalty within the meaning of Section 6662 of the Code. Neither the 
Company nor any Company Subsidiary has been a party to or participated in any way in a 
transaction that would be defined as a “reportable transaction” within the meaning of 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6011-4(b) (including, without limitation, any “listed 
transaction”) or any confidential corporate Tax shelter within the meaning of Treasury 
Regulation Section 1.6111-2.” 
 Electronic Data Systems Corp., May 13, 2008 
 “Neither the Company, nor any of its Subsidiaries has participated (i) in a transaction that is 
the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of transactions that the Internal 
Revenue Service has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction and identified by notice, 
regulation, or other form of published guidance as a listed transaction, as set forth in Treasury 
Regulation § 1.6011-4(b)(1) or, (ii) to the Knowledge of the Company, in a reportable 
transaction (other than a listed transaction), as set forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.6011-
4(b).” 
 Varian Inc., July 26, 2009 
 “Neither the Company nor any Company Subsidiary has consummated, has participated in, or 
is currently participating in any transaction which was or is a “Tax shelter” transaction as 
defined in Sections 6662 or 6111 of the Code or the Treasury Regulations promulgated 
thereunder. Neither the Company nor any Company Subsidiary has participated in, nor are any 
of them currently participating in, a “Listed Transaction” or a “Reportable Transaction” 
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within the meaning of Section 6707A(c) of the Code or Treasury Regulation Section 1.6011-
4(b), or any transaction requiring disclosure under a corresponding or similar provision of 
state, local, or foreign law.” 
 Robbins & Myers Inc., October 6, 2010 
 “For all Tax years and periods since January 1, 2006, neither R&M nor any R&M Subsidiary 
has participated in or been a party to a transaction that, as of the date of this Agreement, 
constitutes a “listed transaction” or “reportable transaction” within the meaning of 
Section 6011 of the Code and applicable Treasury Regulations thereunder (or a similar 
provision of state law).” 
 
 As shown in the above examples, the length and style of the disclosures vary slightly, but 
they are very consistent in terms of content. In particular, all of the disclosures provide two 
pieces of important information: (i) the parties involved (the target firm only or both the acquirer 
and the target, including any subsidiaries) and (ii) the tax shelter transactions (reportable 
transactions, listed transactions, or both, with reference to the relevant regulation sections). The 
disclosures generally refer to non-participation in tax shelters for a target’s entire history up to 
the Form 8-K filing date and do not contain forward-looking information regarding future tax 
shelter participation. Moreover, in some transactions, it is explicitly stated that neither the target 
nor the acquirer shall participate or engage in any reportable or listed transaction pending the 
closing of the deal.   
I use a target’s representation concerning its non-participation in tax shelters as a measure 
of the target’s actual non-sheltering status. That is, I assume that targets that disclose their non-
participation in tax shelters are non-sheltering targets in my analysis. I also assume that targets 
that do not disclose their non-participation in tax shelters are sheltering targets. Note that none of 
the targets in my sample disclose that they have participated in tax shelters. 
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4.3.3 Construct Validity of the Non-Sheltering Measure 
Whether the target’s non-sheltering disclosure measure reliably captures the firm’s 
underlying non-sheltering status depends on two conditions: (i) no sheltering targets will 
misrepresent themselves by claiming non-participation in tax shelters in the Form 8-K, and (ii) 
no non-sheltering targets will withhold such non-sheltering status from the Form 8-K. Violation 
of either condition (i) or (ii) would contaminate my non-sheltering measure and bias against my 
predicted results. This section discusses the validity of the two conditions. 
For condition (i), I argue that no sheltering targets will misrepresent themselves by 
claiming non-participation in tax shelters in the Form 8-K. Participants in a reportable 
transaction must disclose information for each reportable transaction on their tax returns. 
Therefore, it is easy for an acquirer to verify the target’s tax sheltering status via due diligence 
prior to determining the takeover premium. Also, due to the complicated nature of reportable 
transactions, tax sheltering firms receive professional consultation and advice from tax shelter 
promoters before participating in tax shelters. So, it is expected that the target’s team know 
whether their firm’s tax shelters constitute reportable transactions under the law. More important, 
because the Form 8-K is filed with the SEC, all disclosures on the Form 8-K will be subject to 
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (Hardy 2005; Hutching 2008). For these 
reasons, it is unlikely that any sheltering targets will misrepresent themselves by claiming non-
participation in tax shelters in the Form 8-K. Hence, condition (i) is likely to be satisfied. 
For condition (ii), I argue that no non-sheltering targets will withhold such non-sheltering 
status from their Form 8-K. First, the target’s non-sheltering disclosure is made in the Agreement 
and Plan of Merger under the target’s Representation and Warranties section. This section allows 
the acquirer to obtain information about the target before signing the merger agreement 
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(Hutching 2008), and, more important, information contained in this section can be used as a 
basis for the acquirer to terminate the transaction after the merger agreement has been signed 
(Hutching 2008). Therefore, it is in the acquirer’s best interests to have the target state its non-
sheltering status in the Representation and Warranties section to protect against subsequent risk 
of uncovering the target’s tax shelters after the merger agreement is signed. Second, from the 
target’s point of view, a non-sheltering target would be willing to disclose its non-sheltering 
status on the Form 8-K especially if disclosure would facilitate the transaction. Moreover, results 
from prior research imply that non-sheltering targets have little incentive to withhold their non-
sheltering status (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009). Hence, condition (ii) is also likely to be satisfied. 
To empirically support the validity of the non-sheltering measure, in Section 4.4, I will 
compare my sample of disclosing and non-disclosing targets against samples of tax shelter firms 
employed in prior research and provide correlations between the non-sheltering status measure 
and existing measures of tax aggressiveness. 
4.3.4 Regression Specifications 
To test hypotheses H3 and H4, I run the following two regression models, respectively: 
  
PREMIUM = α + β1NONSHELTER + X’ζ + t + ε (10) 
 
    ACAR = α + β1NONSHELTER + X’ζ + t + ε (11) 
 
  
where NONSHELTER, my main independent variable, is an indicator variable equals 1 if the 
target’s non-sheltering status is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable for Equation 
(10), PREMIUM, is either the offer premium (PREM) or target abnormal returns (TCAR). The 
dependent variable for Equation (11) is acquirer abnormal returns (ACAR). The offer premium is 
the ratio of offer price to the target’s trading price one week (four weeks) prior to the merger 
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announcement date, minus one. Both TCAR and ACAR are measured over two event windows 
centered on the Form 8-K filing date, the three-day window [-1, +1], and the five-day window [-
2, +2] to capture stock price reaction to the information disclosed in the Form 8-K in a timely 
manner. Following the standard methodology for event study analysis (Brown and Warner 
1985), I use a market-adjusted model based on CRSP value-weighted return as the market return. 
I estimate a firm’s daily abnormal return by subtracting the CRSP market return from the firm’s 
daily return. I then cumulate the daily abnormal returns over the event window to obtain the 
cumulative abnormal returns. As a robustness check, I estimate abnormal returns using the 
market model with the parameters estimated over a 200-day period between day -210 and day -
11, centered on the Form 8-K filing date. The results are qualitatively similar. Finally, X is a 
vector of firm-specific and deal-specific observable determinants of acquisition gains, and t is 
calendar year fixed-effects. 
Following prior literature on M&A (e.g. Bradley et al. 1988; Masulis et al. 2007), I 
control for a number of target, acquirer, and deal characteristics in Equations (10) and (11). For 
target and acquirer characteristics, I control for firm size (SIZE), Tobin’s Q (TOBINSQ), 
profitability (ROA), and leverage (LEV). Existing research suggests that targets’ information 
uncertainty and financial reporting quality affect takeover premium and acquirer returns (Officer, 
Poulsen, and Stegemoller 2009; McNichols and Stubben 2012; Raman, Shivakumar, and 
Tamayo 2012). To control for the potential effects of the target’s information uncertainty and 
financial reporting quality on takeover premium, I include the target’s monthly stock return 
volatility (VOLAT) and its discretionary accruals (ACCQ), estimated from the modified Jones 
model of Dechow et al. (1995). All the firm-level characteristics are measured at the fiscal year 
end prior to the merger announcement. For deal characteristics, I control for relative deal size 
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(DEALRATIO), whether the deal is a tender offer (TENDER), whether the deal is a stock-
financed transaction (ALLSTOCK), whether the deal is a within-industry merger (INDMATCH), 
and whether the deal is a merger of high-technology firms (HIGHTECH).  
In summary, the variables used in Equations (10) and (11) are defined as follows: 
   
SIZE = Natural logarithm of market value of outstanding equity. 
 
TOBINSQ = Market value of assets over book value of assets, where the market 
value of assets is   computed as the book value of assets plus the market 
value of common stock less the sum of the book value of common 
stock. 
 
ROA = Pre-tax income, scaled by lagged assets. 
 
LEV = Book value of debts, scaled by lagged assets. 
 
VOLAT = Standard deviation of market adjusted monthly stock return measured 
over the 12-month period prior to merger announcement. 
 
ACCQ = Discretionary accruals, estimated from the  modified Jones model by 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
 
TENDER = Indicator variable: 1 for tender offer, and 0 otherwise. 
 
ALLSTOCK = Indicator variable: 1 for 100% stock-financed deal, and 0 otherwise. 
 
DEALRATIO = The total deal value (sum of all considerations paid, excluding fees) 
divided by the acquirer's pre-announcement market value of equity; 
market value of equity is defined as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the stock price at the 6
th
 trading day prior to the merger 
announcement date. 
 
HIGHTECH = Indicator variable: 1 if acquirer and target are both in a high-technology 
industry, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Following the classification scheme in Kimbrough and Louis (2011), 
high-tech industries are as those in SIC codes 2833-2836 
(Pharmaceuticals), 3570-3577 (Computers), 3600-3674 (Electronics), 
7371-7379 (Programming), or 8731-8734 (R&D Services). 
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4.3.5 Sample Selection 
I draw the sample from the SDC Platinum Mergers & Acquisitions database and obtain 
all completed M&A transactions involving publicly-traded U.S. target and acquiring firms. The 
sample firms’ stock return and financial statement data are obtained from CRSP and Compustat, 
respectively. My sample includes transactions announced between January 1, 2005 and 
December 31, 2010 because very few transactions announced prior to 2005 provide such non-
sheltering disclosure. To ensure that my sample only includes deals that result in changes in 
control, I include only deals in which the acquirer owns less than 50% of the shares of the target 
prior to the merger announcement and 100% of the target after the acquisition. I exclude 
transactions with deal values lower than $1 million. 
The initial sample begins with all M&A transactions involving U.S. public acquirers and 
U.S. public targets listed on the SDC database for my sample period. I exclude transactions that 
involve firms in the financial sector (SIC 6000 – 6999) due to its unique nature of regulatory 
environment and data requirements. Since I hand-collect the non-sheltering information from the 
targets’ Form 8-K – Agreement and Plan of Merger, I further exclude transactions that do not 
have Form 8-K filings in the SEC’s EDGAR database. I also eliminate transactions in which the 
Form 8-K is filed before the merger announcement date or filed more than four days after the 
announcement date because firms are required to file a Form 8-K within four business days after 
the merger announcements. Finally, in computing the variables, I exclude observations with 
missing values. These restrictions result in sample sizes of 446 and 420 transactions for the 
takeover premium and acquirer abnormal return analyses, respectively. 
Table 4.3.5 reports the percentage of sample transactions that disclose the target’s non-
sheltering status by announcement year. Of the 446 transactions in my sample, 340 transactions 
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(76.2%) disclose the target’s non-participation in reportable transactions in their Form 8-K, and 
the remaining 106 transactions (23.8%) do not disclose such information. The percentage of 
disclosing deals increases significantly over the sample period from slightly less than 69% in 
2005 to over 87% in 2010. Result from a chi-squared test suggests that this linear trend is highly 
significant. This upward trend suggests that acquirers may have paid more attention to a target’s 
involvement in tax shelters in selecting potential targets or that they may have viewed disclosure 
of the target’s non-sheltering status in the merger agreements to be increasingly important, or 
both. 
4.3.6 Section Summary 
In this section, I discuss the empirical model for testing the two hypotheses outlined in 
Section 4.2. I first describe how I construct the measure of the target’s non-sheltering status and 
the procedure used to construct the validity of my non-sheltering measure. Then, I specify the 
empirical model used to test my hypotheses and discuss the sample selection criteria. The 
following section presents the results from the regression model using the sample specified. 
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Table 4.3.5 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
  
Year 
 
 
 
 
No. of 
Deals 
(Percent 
of 
Sample) 
NON-
SHELTER=1 
(Percent of 
Sample) 
 
Percent of 
NON-
SHELTER=1 
 
 
Mean 
(Median) 
Acquirer  
Market Cap 
($mil) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Target  
Market Cap 
($mil) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Deal Ratio 
 
 
       
       
2005 86 59 68.6 30,850.9 1,828.9 0.276 
 
(19.3) (13.2) 
 
(5,452.1) (344.8) (0.091) 
       2006 88 63 71.6 22,877.7 1,910.6 0.255 
 
(19.7) (14.1) 
 
(3,956.5) (561.7) (0.129) 
       2007 94 66 70.2 19,348.7 967.7 0.271 
 
(21.1) (14.8) 
 
(3,340.7) (528.0) (0.142) 
       2008 55 45 81.8 26,159.4 1,143.5 0.252 
 
(12.3) (10.1) 
 
(4,136.3) (294.5) (0.117) 
       2009 51 44 86.3 31,849.9 2,717.9 0.220 
 
(11.4) (9.90) 
 
(3,017.2) (302.4) (0.087) 
       2010 72 63 87.5 25,849.8 877.3 0.306 
 
(16.1) (14.1)                 (3,548.1) (289.7) (0.063) 
       Total 446 340 76.2 25,582.4 1,523.6 0.249 
 
(100.0) (76.2) 
 
(3,864.5) (414.4) (0.093) 
       The sample consists of 446 completed U.S. M&A deals between 2005 and 2010. NONSHELTER is 
an indicator variable equals 1 if the target’s non-sheltering status is disclosed in the Form 8-K, and 
0 otherwise. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization, which is defined as 
the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 6
th
 trading day prior to 
announcement date. DEALRATIO is the ratio of the total deal value to the acquirer's pre-
announcement market capitalization. 
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4.4 Main Results 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This section presents and discusses the results from the estimation of the empirical model 
specified in Equations (10) and (11). Section 4.4.2 presents the descriptive statistics relevant to 
my primary tests of hypotheses H3 and H4. The presentation also includes a review of a 
correlation table for my primary variables of interest (NONSHELTER) and other tax 
aggressiveness measures used in previous literature. A correlation table for my other control 
variables is also presented. Section 4.4.3 provides the main tables of analysis for hypothesis H3. 
Section 4.4.4 provides the main tables of analysis for hypothesis H4. Section 4.4.5 concludes the 
section.  
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.4.2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for target characteristics as well as mean 
and median comparisons between the disclosing and non-disclosing targets. For the tax 
aggressiveness measures, results from mean differences tests indicate that, while disclosing 
targets and non-disclosing targets face similar five-year cash effective tax rates (CASHETR5), 
disclosing targets exhibit significantly lower total BTD (BTD), lower permanent BTD 
(permBTD), and lower uncertain tax benefits (UTB_SC) than non-disclosing targets. Table 4.4.2 
Panel B presents Pearson correlations among NONSHELTER and other measures of tax 
aggressiveness. NONSHELTER is negatively correlated with UTB_SC, BTD, and PermBTD. 
These results are consistent with the findings in prior studies (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010; 
Lisowsky et al. 2012) that total BTD and uncertain tax benefits are more useful in detecting tax 
shelters than other tax aggressiveness measures are. In sum, existing measures of tax 
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aggressiveness offer some evidence that targets that do not disclose their non-sheltering status in 
their Form 8-K are more tax aggressive than those who disclose. 
In terms of other target characteristics, non-disclosing targets are less profitable (ROA), 
have more research and development expenditures (R&D), and report higher equity-method 
earnings (EQEARN) than disclosing targets. These differences are consistent with the 
characteristics of the samples of tax shelter firms employed in prior studies (Wilson 2009; 
Lisowsky 2010; Lisowsky et al. 2012). 
Table 4.4.2 Panel C presents descriptive statistics on acquirer and deal characteristics of 
the full sample, as well as mean and median comparisons between the disclosing and non-
disclosing targets. All acquirer characteristics are similar with the exception of firm size (SIZE), 
in which acquirers that acquire a non-disclosing target tend to be smaller than those acquire a 
disclosing target. The statistics also indicate that, on average, both takeover premium measures 
(PREM and TCAR) are higher in the disclosing target group than in the non-disclosing target 
group, but that acquirer abnormal return is not significantly different between the two groups. 
For both windows of measurement, TCAR is significantly positive (at the 1% level), and ACAR is 
significantly negative (at the 5% level). In terms of deal characteristics, deals involving a non-
disclosing target are not likely to be tender offers (TENDER) and are usually large in relative 
deal size (DEALRATIO). The correlations presented in Table 4.4.2 Panel D confirm these 
differences. Overall, these univariate results also suggest that the association between the target’s 
non-sheltering status and takeover premium is not driven by the presence of the control 
variables. 
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Table 4.4.2 – Panel A 
Mean Comparisons of Firm-Level Variables Across Samples 
 
Sample This Study Wilson (2009) Lisowsky (2010) Lisowsky et al. (2012) 
Sample 
Period 2005-2010 1975-2002 2000-2004 2006-2009 
 
 
NON-
SHELTER 
= 0 
NON-
SHELTER 
 = 1 
SHELTER  
= 1 
SHELTER  
= 0 
SHELTER  
= 1 
SHELTER 
 = 0 
SHELTER  
= 1 
SHELTER 
 = 0 
  N 340 106 33 33 267 8,956 680 2,582 
 
 
       Tax Avoidance Measures 
      UTB_SC   0.013* 0.008 - - - -  0.013* 0.011 
ETR 0.274 0.276 0.35 0.38 - - 0.298 0.301 
CASHETR5 0.258 0.273 - - - - 0.265 0.261 
BTD   0.028* 0.006  0.02* -0.01 0.046* -0.218 0.042 0.033 
PermBTD   0.014* 0.005 - - - -  0.025* 0.007 
DTAX 0.036 0.031 - - - -  0.059* 0.043 
PSHELTER 0.711 0.638 - - - - - - 
 
 
       Other Firm Characteristics 
      SIZE 5.681 5.717 3.54 3.44 7.804* 3.942  9.514* 7.707 
ROA  0.034* 0.037 0.15 0.10 0.078* -0.443  0.061* 0.069 
FOREIGN 0.013 0.012 0.02 0.01 0.007* 0.002  0.024* 0.018 
LEV 0.201 0.173   0.18* 0.29 0.192* 0.261  0.211* 0.171 
ACCQ 0.003 0.021 -0.01 -0.02 0.066* -0.019    0.019 0.065 
R&D  0.162* 0.112  0.05* 0.03 0.016* 0.112  0.048* 0.086 
EQEARN  0.154* 0.125 - - 0.375* 0.117  0.475* 0.321 
BIG4(5) 0.752 0.769 - - 0.981* 0.650  0.993* 0.943 
TOBINSQ 2.047 2.154 - - - - - - 
VOLAT  0.104* 0.126 - - - - - - 
 
This table presents mean (frequency) differences between the disclosing and non-disclosing target 
subsamples, and mean (frequency) differences between tax shelter firm and non-shelter firm subsamples from 
prior studies.  
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Table 4.4.2 – Panel B 
Pearson Correlations: Tax Aggressiveness Measures 
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
(1) NONSHELTER 
 
       
(2) UTB_SC -0.158        
(3) ETR 0.040 -0.141       
(4) CASHETR5 0.031 -0.010 0.134      
(5) BTD -0.099 0.119 -0.113 -0.294     
(6) PermBTD -0.078 0.039 -0.337 -0.275 0.611    
(7) DTAX -0.021 0.056 -0.133 0.045 0.085 0.194   
(8) PSHELTER -0.062 0.083 -0.025 -0.304 0.242 0.282 0.024  
 This table presents Pearson correlations among tax aggressiveness measures. The coefficients in 
bold are all statistically significant (at ≤10% level) in two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4.4.2 – Panel C 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Full Sample  NONSHELTER = 0 NONSHELTER = 1 P-value for  
Mean Diff 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Acquirer Characteristics 
SIZE 8.437 8.259 7.911 7.707 8.601 8.385 0.003 
TOBINSQ 2.111 1.771 2.178 1.863 2.095 1.769 0.511 
ROA 0.099 0.095 0.099 0.103 0.097 0.093 0.649 
LEV 0.197 0.177 0.218 0.184 0.191 0.174 0.150 
VOLAT 0.086 0.076 0.084 0.074 0.086 0.076 0.768 
BTD 0.046 0.042 0.058 0.045 0.043 0.036 0.137 
CASHETR5 0.281 0.247 0.262 0.244 0.286 0.248 0.401 
 
Deal Characteristics 
TENDER 0.212 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.076 
ALLSTOCK 0.123 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.180 
DEALRATIO 0.249 0.092 0.301 0.167 0.234 0.077 0.078 
INDMATCH 0.637 1.000 0.660 1.000 0.631 1.000 0.576 
HIGHTECH 0.407 0.000 0.349 0.000 0.425 0.000 0.163 
 
Takeover Premium & Abnormal Return (%) 
PREM [1-WEEK] 37.61 30.64 30.09 22.97 39.96 31.90 0.008 
PREM [4-WEEK] 41.58 32.97 32.73 26.65 44.34 34.55 0.006 
TCAR [-1, 1] 23.44 17.61 18.24 15.56 25.07 17.94 0.024 
TCAR [-2, 2] 25.62 19.91 20.80 19.04 27.62 20.57 0.076 
ACAR [-1, 1] -0.667 -0.189 -0.488 -0.625 -0.723 -0.169 0.759 
ACAR [-2, 2] -0.835 -0.344 -0.559 -0.446 -0.928 -0.317 0.629 
        This table presents descriptive statistics he right-most column shows the p-value for t-test (Chi-Square test) 
for mean (frequency) differences between the disclosing and non-disclosing deals.  
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Table 4.4.2 – Panel D 
Panel A: Pearson Correlations: Takeover Premium & Acquirer Abnormal Return Analyses 
 
  
 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) PREM 
 
                 
(2) TCAR [-1,1] 0.69                  
(3) ACAR [-1,1] -0.09 0.04                 
(4) NONSHELTER 0.14 0.10 0.02                
(5) SIZE -0.28 -0.26 0.03 0.01               
(6) TOBINSQ -0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.02 0.08              
(7) ROA -0.19 -0.23 -0.14 0.06 0.32 -0.30             
(8) LEV 0.04 -0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.16 -0.01 -0.06            
(9) ACCQ -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.02           
(10) VOLAT 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.04          
(11) SIZEacq 0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.14 0.50 0.09 0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.02         
(12) TOBINSQacq 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.15 0.36 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 0.15        
(13) ROAacq -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.08 0.23 0.27 0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.39 0.14       
(14) LEVacq 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 0.11 -0.17 0.22 0.04 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 -0.22      
(15) TENDER 0.14 0.23 0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.14 0.13 0.10 -0.17     
(16) ALLSTOCK -0.11 -0.13 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.29 -0.11 -0.13 0.10 -0.18    
(17) DEALRATIO -0.04 -0.11 0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.08 -0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.36 -0.06 -0.12 0.32 -0.14 0.16   
(18) INDMATCH -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.05 0.05 -0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.12 0.04  
(19) HIGHTECH -0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.20 
 
 
  
                
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for variables used in the takeover premium and returns analyses. PREM is the ratio of offer price to the 
target’s trading price 1 week prior to the merger announcement date minus one. The coefficients in bold are all statistically significant (at ≤10% level) in 
two-tail tests. 
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4.4.3 The Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium 
Table 4.4.3 Panel A presents the results of Equation (10). The coefficient estimates on 
NONSHELTER reported in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the target’s non-sheltering status 
is significantly positively associated with takeover premium. The results are qualitatively 
similar whether the offer premium is calculated using the target’s trading price one week 
prior or four weeks prior to the merger announcement date. In addition, as shown in columns 
(3) and (4), consistent results are found using target abnormal returns as the dependent 
variable. Overall, the results indicate that the target’s non-sheltering status is positively 
associated with various measures of takeover premium. 
To ensure these results are not driven by the presence of extreme observations in the 
offer premium measures, I adopt alternative specifications including robust and Tobit 
regressions that address the potential issues of outliners. First, I re-estimate Equation (10) 
using robust regression. Unlike OLS that assigns equal weight to all observations, robust 
regression weighs each observation differently depending on the behavior of the observation 
in the sample. Second, I find that about 3 percent of the premium values in my sample are 
negative. As zero should be an economically meaningful bound for takeover premium 
(Officer, 2003), I employ a Tobit specification with left-censoring at zero to address the 
negative premium values. The results (untabulated) from these alternative specifications 
reinforce my findings that the target’s non-sheltering status is positively associated with 
takeover premium. The results are also robust to winsorizing the premium values at its top 
and bottom one-percentile. 
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In terms of the economic significance of the estimates, the difference in takeover 
premium (4.59 percent) amounts to a mean (median) of $69.7 million ($19 million) in market 
value. It is important to note that, due to the unique research setting and the highly aggressive 
nature of the type of tax shelter studied in this paper (i.e., reportable or listed transactions), 
the estimates of the average premium effect (4 to 5 percent) for my sample are likely to be 
higher than the average effects for other types of tax shelters or aggressive tax planning (i.e., 
non-reportable, non-listed transactions). Therefore, the magnitude of the effect reported in 
this study should not be generalized to other forms of tax avoidance behavior. Overall, the 
results lend support to hypothesis H3 that the target’s non-sheltering status is associated with 
a higher takeover premium. 
Last, the coefficient estimates for the control variables are generally consistent with 
the results documented in prior research (Dong et al. 2005; Moeller et al. 2004; Wang and 
Xie 2008). For example, the results suggest that takeover premium is significantly higher for 
larger acquirers, deals that are larger in relative size, and tender offers; takeover premium is 
lower for larger targets, stock-financed deals, and high-tech mergers. 
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Table 4.4.3 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium 
 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM 
 [4-week] 
TCAR  
[-1,1] 
TCAR  
[-2,2] 
     
 
 NONSHELTER +     4.586**     4.011**     4.198**     4.160** 
  
(2.193) (1.992) (1.859) (1.711) 
Acquirer Traits      
 SIZE        3.472***       4.326***       3.329***       3.671*** 
  (3.885) (4.131) (3.195) (3.328) 
 TOBINSQ  1.491 0.534 -0.599 -0.726 
  (1.268) (0.377) (-0.561) (-0.657) 
 ROA  -13.363 0.070 -3.526 -6.415 
  (-1.049) (0.005) (-0.315) (-0.559) 
 LEV  2.078 5.599 9.849 8.477 
  (0.260) (0.688) (1.311) (1.068) 
Target Traits      
 ACCQ  0.977 1.593 0.872 0.747 
  (0.790) (1.079) (0.775) (0.653) 
 VOLAT  -2.397 -3.367 -2.073 -3.358 
   (-0.134) (-0.164) (-0.131) (-0.203) 
 SIZE        -5.883***       -7.159***       -5.566***       -5.654*** 
  (-6.230) (-6.552) (-5.025) (-4.639) 
 TOBINSQ    -2.021* 0.257 -1.443 -1.647 
  (-1.965) (0.222) (-1.334) (-1.376) 
 ROA  -7.205 -5.189 -14.919 -15.558 
  (-0.967) (-0.599) (-1.462) (-1.466) 
 LEV  4.700 4.205 -10.114 -10.583 
  (1.136) (0.826) (-1.450) (-1.450) 
Deal Traits 
    
 
 TENDER 
 
4.357   6.838*       10.22***     10.81** 
  
(1.273) (1.706) (2.675) (2.577) 
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-4.826 -3.569     -6.192**     -6.224** 
  
(-1.439) (-0.905) (-2.108) (-1.992) 
 DEALRATIO 
 
      4.038***       4.996*** 0.740 0.874 
  
(2.825) (3.488) (0.675) (0.765) 
 INDMATCH 
 
1.175 2.088      6.323***     6.531** 
  
(0.485) (0.782) (2.685) (2.502) 
 HIGHTECH 
 
    -6.400**     -6.852**       -10.79***       -11.77*** 
  
(-2.431) (-2.390) (-4.247) (-4.186) 
Intercept        48.60***       49.87***       35.61***       34.25*** 
  (5.412) (4.525) (3.944) (3.885) 
     
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.236 0.240 0.228 0.233 
     N 
 
446 446 401 401 
     
 
This table reports regression results of takeover premium on the target’s non-sheltering status. Calendar year 
fixed-effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-
tailed for  NONSHELTER, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.4.3.1 The Role of the Target’s Uncertain Tax Benefits 
Next, I address whether the target’s non-sheltering status provides acquirers with 
value-relevant (private) information incremental to existing measures of tax aggressiveness 
constructed based on the target’s publicly available financial data by controlling for BTD, tax 
shelter probability (PSHELTER), and CASHETR5 in the premium regressions. The results in 
Panel A of Table 4.4.3.1 show that the coefficients on NONSHELTER remain significantly 
positive, indicating that the target’s non-sheltering status plays an essential role in acquirers’ 
valuation of target firms.  
FIN 48, effective the first quarter of 2007, requires financial statement disclosure of 
accounting reserve for future tax contingencies or uncertain tax benefits (UTB). Using 
proprietary IRS data, Lisowsky et al. (2012) find that UTB reserves reflect tax shelter 
participation. To the extent that targets account for the contingent liabilities associated with 
the tax shelters by properly recording a UTB reserve for their tax shelter positions, the 
target’s non-sheltering status may not reflect on the takeover premium. However, as 
discussed in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), the amount of UTB is an accounting accrual 
subject to management judgment and may not be consistently recorded due to financial 
reporting incentives of the firms. Consistent with this view, DeSimone, Robinson, and 
Stomberg (2012) document a significant variation in management judgment in establishing a 
UTB reserve. If the target’s UTB are not consistently recorded, the target’s UTB may not 
have a significant effect on acquirers’ valuation of the target’s non-sheltering status. To 
examine the role of the target’s UTB on the association between the target’s non-sheltering 
status and takeover premium, I include the variable UTB and the interaction of UTB and 
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NONSHELTER in Equation (10). Following Lisowsky et al. (2012), I use both the UTB 
scaled by total assets (UTB_SC) and the natural log of UTB (UTB_LN). 
Reported in Panel B of Table 4.4.3.1, the results show that the association between 
the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover premium remains significantly positively after 
controlling for the target’s UTB. Specifically, the coefficients on UTB_SC and UTB_LN are 
positive, and the coefficients on the interaction terms (UTB_SC×NONSHELTER and 
UTB_LN×NONSHELTER) are negative, but none of them is statistically significant. The 
negative interactive effects suggest that the positive premium effect of the target’s non-
sheltering status is weaker among targets that have a higher UTB reserve; however, the 
difference is not significant. Overall, the results suggest that the positive association between 
the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover premium is not affected by the target’s level of 
UTB. 
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Table 4.4.3.1 – Panel A 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium 
 
 
 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
TCAR  
[-1,1] 
TCAR  
[-1,1] 
TCAR  
[-1,1]  
  
  
   
 
 NONSHELTER 
   
4.052** 
      
   4.830*** 
       
    5.380**     3.857** 
         
 3.944**     4.958**  
 
(1.996) (2.360)  (2.095) (1.751) (1.865) (1.875)  
 BTD target 
      
    -
36.38***       -30.56** 
  
 
 
(-2.844)   (-2.237) 
  
 
 PSHELTER target 
 
      -12.23***  
 
-13.50 
 
 
  
(-2.402)  
 
(-0.935) 
 
 
 CASHETR5 target 
 
       22.91*** 
  
12.22  
  
 (3.735) 
  
(1.352)  
  
  
   
 
 Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included  
  
  
   
 
 Adjusted R2 0.236 0.249 0.348 0.255 0.230 0.286  
     N 446 446 215 401 401 215  
  
 
   
 
 
 
Table 4.4.3.1 – Panel B 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium:     
The Role of the Target’s Tax Reserves 
 
 
 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
TCAR  
[-1,1] 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
TCAR  
[-1,1] 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 NONSHELTER     6.402**     7.154**     6.586**     5.954** 
 
 
 
(1.869) (1.755) (1.709) (1.823) 
 
 
 UTB_SC target 0.040 0.038 
   
 
 
(0.974) (1.072) 
   
 
 UTB_SC target -0.113 -0.150 
   
 
 × NONSHELTER (-0.563) (-0.774) 
   
 
  
 UTB_LN target 
 
 1.350 1.004 
 
 
  
 (0.746) (0.818) 
 
 
 UTB_LN target   -0.956 -0.918 
 
 
 × NONSHELTER  
 
 (-0.590) (-0.783) 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 Control Variables Included Included Included Included 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 Adjusted R
2
 0.282 0.321 0.312 0.262 
 
 
     N 161 161 161 161 
 
 
  
 
   
 
This table reports regression results of takeover premium on the target’s non-sheltering status. year fixed-
effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for 
NONSHELTER, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.4.3.2 The Role of the Target’s Information Environment 
The agency view of tax avoidance suggests that the complexity of tax shelter 
arrangements increases the opaqueness of a firm’s information environment (Balakrishnan, 
Blouin, and Guay 2011), allowing opportunistic managers to engage in rent-diverting 
activities such as earnings manipulation, insider transactions, and bad news hoarding (Desai 
et al. 2007; Desai and Dharmapala 2008; Kim, Li, Zhang 2011). Similarly, acquirers may be 
more concerned that tax shelters are being used to cover up the target’s corporate misdeeds 
or other bad news especially when the targets are opaque. Therefore, I examine whether the 
positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover premium is 
stronger among targets that have a more opaque information environment. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 4.4.3.2, the results using subsamples of targets with 
high and low information transparency (partitioned based on the median value of their stock 
return volatility) are consistent with the above prediction. Results (untabulated) based on 
interaction specifications are consistent with the results based on sample partition. 
Specifically, the results indicate that the positive association between the target’s non-
sheltering status and takeover premium is stronger among targets that have a less transparent 
firm-specific information environment.  
4.4.3.3 The Role of the Acquirer’s Tax Aggressiveness 
The documented positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and 
takeover premium suggests that acquirers view the target’s participation in tax shelters as a 
red flag. An alternative explanation for this result is that the acquirers intend to take 
advantage of the additional tax planning opportunities in an “under-sheltered” target. For 
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example, Badertscher et al. (2011) suggest that private equity firms actively use tax planning 
as a tool of economic value for their portfolio firms. Likewise, Cheng et al. (2012) find that 
activist, tax-savvy hedge funds improve the tax efficiency of their portfolio firms. To address 
this alternative explanation, I conduct two additional analyses. First, I investigate whether the 
positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover premium varies 
with the acquirer’s tax aggressiveness. For example, if my results are driven by the under-
sheltered target explanation, acquirers that are less tax aggressive would place a lower value 
on the target’s non-sheltering status than tax aggressive acquirers would. To examine this 
possibility, I partition the sample into two subsamples based on the median value of 
acquirers’ BTD and re-estimate Equation (10) with the two subsamples.  
Reported in columns (1) to (4) of Panel B of Table 4.4.3.2, the results show that the 
positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover premium is 
significantly stronger for acquirers that are less tax aggressive. Results (untabulated) using 
interaction specifications indicate that the positive valuation effect of the target’s non-
sheltering status increases by 0.712 percent for every one percent decrease in the acquirer’s 
BTD. Similar results are obtained using other tax aggressiveness measures. These results 
suggest that tax aggressive acquirers place a lower value on the target’s non-sheltering status 
than less aggressive acquirers do, inconsistent with the alternative explanation of “under-
sheltered” targets. More important, these findings highlight the essential role that the 
acquirer’s tax aggressiveness plays in valuing the target’s non-sheltering status. 
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4.4.3.4 Relative Tax Aggressiveness of the Acquirer and Target 
Second, I include a proxy of the degree of under-sheltering of targets – the relative 
tax aggressiveness of the acquirer and target – as an additional control variable in Equation 
(10): 
I use BTD to measure firms’ tax aggressiveness, but the results are qualitatively 
similar when other measures of tax aggressiveness are used to construct the relative tax 
aggressiveness measure. Reported in columns (5) and (6) of Panel B of Table 4.4.3.2, the 
results on D_BTD are mixed. In particular, association between D_BTD and the one-week 
offer premium is positive and significant, but no significant association is observed between 
D_BTD and target abnormal returns. In both regressions, the coefficient on NONSHELTER 
remains significantly positive, suggesting that my prior findings are not driven by the “under-
sheltered targets” explanation. 
  
 D_BTD = BTDacquirer – BTDtarget (12) 
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Table 4.4.3.2 – Panel A 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium:            
The Role of the Target’s Information Environment 
 
 
 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM 
[1-week] 
PREM  
[1-week] 
Target 
 Transparency  Low High   Low High   Low High  
  
 
   
 
 NONSHELTER     5.684** 1.514    6.887** 1.926     7.630** 1.495 
 
(1.784) (0.476) (2.158) (0.611) (2.294) (0.149) 
 BTD target   -28.45*     -38.29** 
   
 
 
(-1.746) (-2.156) 
   
 
 PSHELTER target 
 
 -11.87 -13.14 
 
 
  
 (-1.293) (-1.488) 
 
 
 UTB target 
 
 
  
0.018 -0.032 
  
 
  
(0.118) (-0.264) 
  
 
   
 
 Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
  
 
   
 
 Adjusted R
2
 0.247 0.371 0.235 0.374 0.303 0.462 
     N 223 223 223 223 98 63 
  
 
   
 
 
Table 4.4.3.2 – Panel B 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium:       
The Role of the Acquirer’s Tax Aggressiveness 
 
 
 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
PREM 
[1-week] 
PREM 
 [1-week] 
TCAR 
 [1,1] 
 Acquirer Tax  
 Aggressiveness  Low High   Low High   
 
 
  
 
   
 
 NONSHELTER     7.282** 2.223      8.451*** 2.019     5.110**     4.191** 
 
(1.993) (0.681) (2.373) (0.613) (2.150) (1.854) 
 BTD target   -33.10*   -31.07* 
   
 
 
(-1.730) (-1.840) 
   
 
PSHELTER target 
 
 6.723 8.485 
 
 
  
 (0.542) (0.898) 
 
 
 D_BTD 
 
 
  
    26.44** 7.460 
  
 
  
(2.366) (0.589) 
  
 
   
 
 Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
  
 
   
 
 Adjusted R
2
 0.288 0.284 0.275 0.281 0.247 0.239 
     N 218 228 218 228 446 446 
  
 
   
 
This table reports regression results of takeover premium on the target’s non-sheltering status. Calendar year 
fixed-effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed 
for  NONSHELTER, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.4.4 The Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Acquirer Returns 
Table 4.4.4 reports the regression results of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns 
(ACAR) on the target’s non-sheltering status. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 
4.4.4, the coefficient on NONSHELTER is negative, but not statistically significant in either 
model. Therefore, my prediction for hypothesis H4 is not supported. These results suggest 
that, on average, acquirer shareholders do not share the valuation benefits of the target’s non-
participation in tax shelters. To better understand the insignificant relation between the 
target’s non-sheltering status and acquirer returns, I examine whether the relation varies with 
(i) the acquirer’s governance and (ii) the target’s information environment. 
4.4.4.1 The Role of the Acquirer’s Corporate Governance 
Prior research finds that tax avoidance increases firm value when the firm is well-
governed (Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Wilson 2009). In M&A, shareholders of well-
governed acquirers may view that the firms are not optimally aggressive in their tax planning 
when acquiring a non-sheltering target. In contrast, shareholders of weakly governed 
acquirers may be concerned that the firms may use the tax shelters to cover up any 
misbehavior when acquiring a sheltering target. I test this idea by including an indicator 
variable of well governed acquirers and its interaction with NONSHELTER in the model. 
Following Gompers et al.’s (2003), I consider acquirers with strong governance 
(GOODGOV) if the acquirers have a G-Index of 5 or less (i.e., the Democracy firms). The 
results reported in Table 4.4.4 (columns 3 and 4) show that, in both regressions, the 
coefficient on NONSHELTER is significantly positive, indicating that the target’s non-
sheltering status is associated with a higher acquirer return for poorly-governed acquirers. In 
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addition, the coefficient on the interaction term (GOODGOV × NONSHELTER) suggests 
that the association between the target’s non-sheltering status and acquirer returns is 
significantly more negative for well-governed acquirers than for weakly governed acquirers, 
although the main effect for well-governed acquirers is indistinguishable from zero. These 
results are consistent with the agency view of tax avoidance that the target’s non-sheltering 
status is viewed by shareholders of acquirers with weak (strong) corporate governance to be a 
favorable (neutral) event. Finally, consistent with the findings in Masulis et al. (2007), I find 
a positive association between well-governed acquirers and acquirer returns.   
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Table 4.4.4 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Acquirer Returns 
 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
ACAR  
[-1,1] 
ACAR  
[-2,2] 
ACAR  
[-1,1] 
ACAR  
[-2,2]  
  
 
   
 
 NONSHELTER + -0.085 -0.796   1.941*   1.264*  
  
(-0.225) (-0.960) (1.822) (1.946)  
 GOODGOV acquirer 
 
 
 
  2.017* 1.003  
  
 
 
(1.694) (1.612)  
 GOODGOV acquirer × 
NONSHELTER   
 
  -2.317*   -1.297*  
 
 
 
 
(-1.723) (-1.720)  
Acquirer Traits       
 SIZE   0.295  0.622 -0.067 -0.057  
  (1.146) (0.917) (-0.249) (-0.786)  
 TOBINSQ  -0.155 -0.186 -0.225 -0.317  
  (-0.514) (-0.685) (-0.712) (-0.583)  
 ROA  2.627 3.225 3.078 3.221  
  (0.763) (0.837) (0.983) (1.230)  
 LEV  -0.579 -0.996 0.257 0.171  
  (-0.432) (-0.430) (0.731) (0.835)  
Target Traits       
 ACCQ        0.564***       0.601*** 0.191     -0.214**  
  (2.613) (2.804) (0.765) (-2.228)  
 VOLAT  -2.163 -2.902 -0.263 -0.486  
  (-0.625) (-0.812) (-0.656) (-0.430)  
 SIZE    -0.486*   -0.449*   -0.374*  -0.574*  
  (-1.667) (-1.710) (-1.763) (-1.808)  
 TOBINSQ    -0.484*   -0.479*   -0.415*  -0.530*  
  (-1.859) (-1.927) (-1.690) (-1.781)  
 ROA        2.129***     1.963** -1.639 -1.322  
  (2.624) (2.265) (-0.912) (-0.782)  
 LEV  -1.179 -1.307 -1.245 -0.970  
  (-1.055) (-1.249) (-1.277) (-1.392)  
 BTD  3.136 2.828     9.879**     6.745**  
  (0.921) (0.863) (2.109) (2.213)  
Deal Traits       
 TENDER  -0.287 -0.146 -0.283 -0.192  
  (-0.354) (-0.177) (-0.646) (-0.515)  
 ALLSTOCK   -1.201*  -1.208     -3.925**     -2.243**  
  (-1.732) (-1.339) (-2.340) (-2.209)  
 DEALRATIO  0.298 0.360 -0.287 0.158  
  (0.483) (0.793) (-0.342) (0.101)  
 INDMATCH  0.634 0.837 0.362 0.795  
  (1.087) (1.201) (0.553) (0.630)  
 HIGHTECH  -1.026 -0.999 -0.443 -1.185  
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  (-1.479) (-1.392) (-1.593) (-1.412)  
Intercept  1.230 1.872 3.403 3.142  
  (0.872) (0.829) 1.398 1.445  
  
 
   
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.062 0.064 0.072 0.075  
     N 
 
420 420 305 305  
  
 
   
 
This table reports regression results of acquirer returns on the target’s non-sheltering status. Calendar year 
fixed-effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-
tailed for  NONSHELTER, and two-tailed for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.4.5 Section Summary 
The results reported in this section are generally consistent with the notion that the 
target’s non-sheltering status is significantly positively associated with takeover premium. 
Alternative specifications including robust and Tobit regressions confirm that the 
documented results are not driven by the presence of extreme observations in the offer 
premium measures. However, the results of my regression model as specified in Equation 
(11) do not support my prediction for Hypothesis H4, suggesting that, on average, acquirer 
shareholders do not share the valuation benefits of the target’s non-participation in tax 
shelters. By partitioning acquirers into well- and poorly-governed firms, the cross-sectional 
analysis reveals that the target’s non-sheltering status is viewed by shareholders of acquirers 
with weak (strong) corporate governance to be a favorable (neutral) event. In addition, I find 
a positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and acquirer returns for 
targets that have a less transparent information environment. 
4.5 Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks 
4.5.1 Introduction 
This section provides the results from performing a series of additional analysis and 
robustness checks on the main results reported in Section 4.4. In order to mitigate the 
concern that the positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover 
premium is driven by the potential endogenous disclosure decision, Section 4.5.2 and Section 
4.5.3 reports the results from employing the Heckman’s two-stage approach. Specifically, 
Section 4.5.2 specifies the probit regression model used to estimate the target’s decision to 
disclose its non-sheltering status. Section 4.5.3 presents the results of the empirical model as 
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specified in Equations (10) and (11) including the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the 
probit model in Section 4.5.2 as an additional regressor. Section 4.5.4 presents the results of 
the main regression model after excluding firms with a low predicted probability of tax 
sheltering in the non-disclosing group in order to mitigate the influence of contaminated 
control sample on my results. Section 4.5.5 concludes the section. 
4.5.2 Determinants of the the Target’s Non-Sheltering Disclosure 
Due to the voluntary nature of the non-sheltering disclosure, one concern is that the 
decision to disclose the target’s non-sheltering status is determined by the acquirer 
management. In that case, the relation between NONSHELTER and the dependent variable 
(PREM or TCAR) may be endogenous. That is, the observed higher takeover premium may 
be due to other economic factors that are associated with the target or acquirer. To examine 
whether the positive association between the target’s non-sheltering status and takeover 
premium is driven by the potential endogenous disclosure decision, I employ the Heckman’s 
(1979) two-stage approach. The next section discusses possible economic factors that may 
affect the decision to disclose the target’s non-sheltering status disclosure choice. 
Prior research suggests that tax aggressiveness is related to firms’ propensity to 
provide supplemental tax-related disclosures. For example, Gleason and Mills (2002) 
document that firms rarely disclose IRS claims for tax deficiencies and that the likelihood of 
disclosure increases as the materiality of the claim increases. McGuire (2009) finds that firms 
with higher ETR-related earnings are more likely to provide an explanation for the decrease in 
ETR. In this study, I expect less tax aggressive acquirers to be more likely to disclose the 
target’s non-sheltering status. Existing literature suggests that a firm’s tax aggressiveness 
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reflects the preferences of the firm’s shareholders (Badertscher et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 
2012). Assuming that firms that are less tax aggressive are mostly owned by investors who 
take a less aggressive view on the firms’ tax avoidance strategies, acquirers that are less tax 
aggressive will be subject to higher investors’ demand for information regarding the target’s 
tax sheltering status. I use total BTD to measure the acquirer’s tax aggressiveness because 
prior research shows that, among various proxies of tax aggressiveness, total BTD is more 
useful in explaining tax shelter participation (Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010). 
The decision to release the target’s non-sheltering status may also be associated with 
the acquirer’s overall disclosure practice. Following Lang and Lundholm (1993), I include 
acquirer firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), and information environment (VOLAT) to 
control for the possible effects of the acquirer’s overall disclosure policies on the decision to 
disclose the target’s non-sheltering status. I expect these determinants of disclosure policies 
to be positively associated with the probability of non-sheltering disclosure. Following 
Kimbrough and Louis (2011), I include indicator variables for transactions in the high-
technology industries (HIGHTECH) and transactions that are financed with stocks 
(ALLSTOCK) to control for the acquirer’s propensity to provide supplemental disclosure in 
M&A. 
To control for the target’s tax shelter likelihood in the determinant model, I include 
factors that were found to be associated with the use of tax shelters in prior research. 
Specifically, following Wilson (2009) and Lisowsky (2010), I control for target size (SIZE), 
profitability (ROA), total BTD, income from foreign operation (FOREIGN), leverage (LEV), 
accounting quality (ACCQ), research and development expenditures (R&D), inconsistent 
book-tax treatment as measured by the presence of equity method earnings (EQEARN), the 
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use of a Big Four auditor (BIG4), and the target’s stock return volatility (VOLAT), a proxy 
for the transparency of the target’s information environment. I expect these variables to be 
negatively associated with the likelihood of non-sheltering disclosure. 
In sum, after controlling for the target’s tax sheltering likelihood, I model the decision 
to disclose the target’s non-sheltering status as a function of firm and deal-level determinants. 
I run the following probit model: 
  
Pr(NONSHELTER=1) = Ф (α + β1 ACCQtarget + β2 VOLATtarget + β3 SIZEtarget  
                                      + β4 ROAtarget + β5 LEVtarget + β6 BTDtarget + β7 FOREIGNtarget  
                                      + β8 R&Dtarget + β9 EQEARNtarget + β10 BIG4target  
                                      + β11 SIZEacq + β12 ROAacq + β13 VOLATacq + β14 BTDacq  
                                                         + β15 ALLSTOCK + β16 HIGHTECH + ε) 
 
(13) 
  
  
where NONSHELTER is an indicator variable equals 1 if the target’s non-sheltering status is 
disclosed, and 0 otherwise.  
Table 4.5.3 presents the results of the disclosure determinant model. As expected, the 
association between acquirer BTD and disclosure is negative and significant, suggesting that 
the target’s non-sheltering status is more likely to be disclosed in transactions that involve a 
less tax aggressive acquirer. Acquirer size is also a significant determinant of disclosure but 
the degree of information uncertainty of the acquirers (VOLAT) is not. Overall, these results 
indicate that the acquirer’s tax aggressiveness and size are positively associated with the 
likelihood of disclosing the target’s non-sheltering status. 
In terms of target characteristics, I find that the target’s stock return volatility and 
profitability are both positively related to the target’s non-sheltering disclosure, consistent 
with the interpretation that acquirers are more likely to disclose the target’s non-sheltering 
status when the targets are more opaque and more profitable. Also, the target’s BTD and 
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equity in earnings (EQEARN) are both negatively related to the target’s non-sheltering 
disclosure. These results are consistent with those in Lisowsky et al. (2012) and suggest that 
these firm-level variables are useful in identifying non-sheltering targets. Finally, mergers 
between high-tech firms are also associated with a higher likelihood of non-sheltering 
disclosure. 
4.5.3 Potential Endogeneity of the Target’s Non-Sheltering Disclosure  
To verify that my results are not driven by the potential endogenous disclosure 
decision, I first implement Heckman’s (1979) procedure by using the probit model in 
Equation (13) as the first-stage regression. The coefficient estimates in the probit model can 
be used to compute the “inverse Mills ratio” (λ), which is then included as an additional 
regressor in the estimation of Equations (10) and (11) using OLS to correct for self-selection 
bias. The results of this estimation are reported in Table 4.5.3. When the Heckman approach 
is used to control for self-selection bias, the coefficient estimates on NONSHELTER remain 
significantly positive across premium regressions, but the coefficient estimate on 
NONSHELTER remains statistically insignificant in the acquirer return regressions 
(untabulated). For all specifications, the estimated coefficients on the self-selection parameter 
λ (LAMBDA) are not statistically significant, suggesting that the results are unlikely to be 
driven by selection bias. 
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Table 4.5.3 
2SLS Estimation: 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium 
  
 
 
 First-stage   Second-stage  
  
  
Pred. 
Sign NONSHELTER PREM [1-week] TCAR [-1,1] 
 
     
 NONSHELTER  +      4.626**    4.048** 
    (1.975) (1.845) 
 LAMBDA  ?  5.875 8.453 
    (0.920) (1.141) 
Acquirer Traits      
 SIZE  +       0.114***       3.897***       3.674*** 
   (2.519) (4.173) (3.330) 
 TOBINSQ    0.963 -0.587 
    (0.819) (-0.509) 
 ROA  + 0.471 -7.047 -1.134 
   (0.737) (-0.645) (-0.436) 
 LEV    1.895 8.741 
    (0.542) (1.143) 
 VOLAT  + 0.390   
   (0.366)   
 BTD  –     -2.541**   
   (-2.207)   
Target Traits      
 ACCQ  – -0.041 1.043 1.325 
   (-0.801) (0.843) (1.185) 
 VOLAT  +   1.441* 2.788 -6.863 
    (1.695) (0.165) (-0.403) 
 SIZE  – -0.027       -6.147***       5.692*** 
   (0.518) (-6.451) (-5.092) 
 TOBINSQ        -2.057** -1.239 
    (-1.972) (-1.049) 
 ROA  –     0.379** -0.708 -14.91 
   (2.021) (-0.974) (-1.514) 
 LEV  + 0.113 5.118 -10.58 
   (0.460) (1.223) (-1.482) 
 BTD  –       -2.852***   
   (-3.028)   
 FOREIGN  – -0.029   
   (-0.204)   
 R&D  –  0.203   
    (0.405)   
 EQEARN  –       -14.01***   
   (-2.742)   
 BIG4  –  0.084   
    (0.963)   
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Deal Traits    
 
 
 TENDER    5.086       9.950*** 
    (1.433) (2.543) 
 ALLSTOCK  + 0.117 -3.927     -6.245** 
   (0.432) (-1.165) (-2.002) 
 DEALRATIO         4.289*** 0.949 
    (3.231) (1.348) 
 INDMATCH    0.442     5.455** 
    (0.189) (2.334) 
 HIGHTECH  +   0.235*   -5.360**      -9.952*** 
   (1.691) (-2.004) (-3.701) 
Intercept         44.34***      30.31*** 
    (4.733) (3.320) 
 Log-Likelihood   -235.80   
 Chi-Square         38.73***   
 Pseudo R
2
   0.073   
 Adjusted R
2
    0.247 0.238 
     N   446 446 401 
 
 
  This table reports regression results of takeover premium on the target’s non-sheltering status, based on 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage approach using Equation (13) as the first-stage regression. LAMBDA is the 
inverse Mill’s ratio. Calendar year fixed-effects are included. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics 
computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * 
represent significance levels (One-tailed for the variables in the first-stage regression; one-tailed for  
NONSHELTER, and two-tailed for control variables in the second-stage regression) at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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4.5.4 Potential Contamination of the Sheltering Target Sample 
I assume that targets that do not disclose their non-participation in tax shelters are tax 
shelter participants. However, since a target’s actual tax sheltering status is not observable, a 
non-disclosing target may not always indicate that it is engaging in tax sheltering. Therefore, 
the potential presence of any non-sheltering targets in the non-disclosing group would 
contaminate my control sample. In an attempt to mitigate the influence of contaminated 
control sample on my results, I identify targets that have a low predicted probability of tax 
sheltering in the non-disclosing group and exclude them from the estimation. I compute the 
firm-level tax sheltering probability using Wilson’s (2009) tax shelter likelihood models.  
Reported in Table 4.5.4, the coefficients on NONSHELTER remain positive and 
highly significant across takeover premium regressions. Coefficients on the control variables 
are similar to those documented previously. After the noisy observations in the non-
disclosing group are dropped, both the magnitude and statistical significance level of the 
coefficients on NONSHELTER increase slightly compared with those reported in Table 4.4.2. 
In sum, the potential presence of non-sheltering targets in the non-disclosing group does not 
adversely affect my main findings that acquirers reward non-sheltering targets with higher 
takeover premiums. 
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Table 4.5.4 
The Association between the Target’s Non-Sheltering Status and Takeover Premium 
 
 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
PREM  
[1-week] 
PREM  
[4-week]  
TCAR      
[-1,1] 
TCAR     
 [-2,2]  
    
  
 
 
 NONSHELTER +       6.067***       5.8112**         4.769**         5.233**  
  
(2.659) (2.131)  (1.973) (2.090)  
Acquirer Traits        
 SIZE        3.348***       4.120***        3.820***       3.984***  
  (3.115) (5.349)  (2.964) (2.545)  
 TOBINSQ  1.543 0.449  -0.162 -0.573  
  (1.412) (0.280)  (-0.142) (-0.746)  
 ROA  -12.84 -0.650  5.492 14.31  
  (-0.998) (-0.235)  (0.774) (1.230)  
 LEV  4.763 3.874  14.43*   29.45*  
  (0.648) (0.438)  (1.809) (1.803)  
Target Traits       
 SIZE        -5.993***       -7.054***        -5.739***       -5.032***  
  (-5.621) (-5.828)  (-5.020) (-4.989)  
 TOBINSQ      -2.072** 0.582  -1.201 -1.442  
  (-2.345) (0.631)  (-0.894) (-1.343)  
 ROA     -9.554** -3.879      -23.54**     -29.70**  
  (-1.991) (-1.374)  (-2.202) (-2.223)  
 LEV  3.801  3.238*  -2.023 10.23  
  (1.225) (1.790)  (-0.667) (1.578)  
Deal Traits 
   
  
 
 
 TENDER 
 
3.547   5.350*      10.15**     8.342**  
  
(1.466) (1.793)  (2.350) (2.302)  
 ALLSTOCK 
 
-3.211 -3.212      -8.453**     -7.903**  
  
(-1.201) (-1.192)  (-2.108) (-2.338)  
 DEALRATIO 
 
      4.401***       4.917***  0.844 -0.932  
  
(2.890) (3.021)  (0.423) (-0.293)  
 INDMATCH 
 
0.889 2.342    5.058* 3.721  
  
(0.647) (0.833)  (1.743) (0.801)  
 HIGHTECH 
 
    -6.010**     -5.626**        -10.32***       -12.02***  
  
(-2.213) (-2.209)  (-3.775) (-3.182)  
Intercept 
 
      47.04***       47.34***        34.92***       34.12***  
  
(5.079) (4.210)  (4.023) (3.934)  
    
  
 
 
 Adjusted R
2
 
 
0.230 0.235  0.222 0.228  
     N 
 
420 420  378 378  
    
  
 
 
This table reports regression results of takeover premium on targets’ non-sheltering status after dropping 
observations that are in the bottom quartile of the tax-sheltering probabilities from the non-disclosing group.  
Coefficients on control variables are not reported for brevity. Calendar year fixed-effects are included. 
Reported in parentheses are t-statistics computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted 
for acquirer clustering; ***, **, * represent significance levels (one-tailed for NONSHELTER, and two-tailed 
for control variables) at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.5.5 Section Summary 
To address the concern about the potential endogeneity of the decision to disclose the 
target’s non-sheltering status, I employ Heckman’s two-stage approach to control for self-
selection bias. To do this, I develop a first-stage disclosure determinant model based on 
existing literature on tax sheltering and disclosure. The results suggest that my prior results 
are not affected by the potential endogeneity. In addition, I identify the noisy observations 
based on estimated tax shelter probability computed using Wilson’s (2009) tax shelter 
likelihood model and remove them from the estimation. The results suggest that the potential 
presence of non-sheltering targets in the non-disclosing group does not adversely affect my 
main findings that acquirers reward non-sheltering targets with higher takeover premiums. 
4.6 Conclusions 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) call for research on the effects of tax avoidance on M&A. 
In response, this study examines whether and how the target’s non-sheltering status affects 
takeover premium and acquirer returns. Specifically, using a novel dataset that identifies 
targets’ non-participation in tax shelters in a sample of 446 transactions, I find that the 
target’s non-sheltering status is associated with a higher takeover premium. This positive 
association is stronger for acquirers that are less tax aggressive. I also find that the target’s 
non-sheltering status is positively associated with acquirer returns for weakly governed 
acquirers and for opaque targets. Overall, the results indicate that, while the valuation 
benefits of the target’s non-participation in tax shelters are mainly accrued to the target’s own 
shareholders rather than to those of the acquiring firm, acquirer shareholders can enjoy 
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higher acquisition gains from a non-sheltering target if the acquirer is weakly governed or if 
the target is opaque. 
My findings are subject to at least one limitation. In this study, I assume that targets 
that do not disclose their non-participation in tax shelters are sheltering targets. However, 
because tax sheltering participation is not observable from publicly available data, it is not 
possible to determine the amount of noise in the non-disclosing group (i.e., the number of 
non-sheltering targets in the non-disclosing group). While I attempt to overcome this inherent 
limitation by teasing out the noisiest observations, I acknowledge that there is no way to 
ensure that every target in the non-disclosing group is a sheltering target. 
Despite this limitation, this study contributes to a fuller understanding of the 
consequences of tax sheltering by demonstrating the importance of the target’s non-
sheltering status in M&A. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I examine two related questions on whether and how tax 
aggressiveness of firms is associated with shareholder wealth in a new context of M&A. The 
first study investigates whether and how the tax aggressiveness of the acquirers and targets 
affects shareholder wealth. I present the idea of tax aggressiveness transfer whereby the 
acquirer’s propensity for tax planning applies to its target’s tax function after the change in 
ownership. I measure the degree of tax aggressiveness transfer using the relative tax 
aggressiveness of the acquirer and target (i.e., the difference in tax aggressiveness between 
the two firms). I hypothesize and find that acquisition gains are positively associated with the 
relative tax aggressiveness of the acquirer and target. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that 
acquirer corporate governance is an important determinant of shareholder wealth effects. In 
particular, I find that, when acquirers are well-governed, acquisitions of targets with lower 
tax aggressiveness by acquirers with higher tax aggressiveness generate significantly higher 
acquisition gains. The results are robust to various measures of tax aggressiveness. In sum, 
my findings suggest that the relative tax aggressiveness of the acquirer and target is a 
significant determinant of value creation or destruction in M&A. 
The second study is devoted to studying whether and how the target’s participation of 
tax shelters – an extreme form of tax aggressiveness – matters in acquires’ valuation of the 
target firm. Using a novel dataset that identifies targets’ non-participation in tax shelters, I 
find that the target’s non-sheltering status is associated with a higher takeover premium, 
indicating that acquirers reward targets for not engaging in tax sheltering. This positive 
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association is stronger for targets that are more opaque and for acquirers that are less tax 
aggressive. In addition, I find that the target’s non-sheltering status is positively associated 
with acquirer returns for acquirers that are weakly governed and for targets that are more 
opaque. Overall, my findings suggest that the target’s non-sheltering status is relevant in 
acquirers’ valuation of the target, and that the valuation benefits of the target’s non-
participation in tax shelters are mainly accrued to the target’s own shareholders rather than to 
those of the acquiring firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 118 
 
References 
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford. 2001. New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15: 103-120. 
 
Aon. 2009. Tax Insurance and FIN 48. Aon Financial Solutions. 
  
Armstrong, C., J. Blouin, and D. Larcker. 2012. The Incentives for Tax Planning. Journal of  
Accounting and Economics 53: 391-411. 
 
Armstrong, C., A. Jagolinzer, and D. Larcker. 2010. Chief Executive Officer Equity  
Incentives and Accounting Irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research 48: 225- 
271. 
 
Auerbach, A. J., and D. Reishus. 1988. The Impact of Taxation on Mergers and Acquisitions.  
In Mergers and Acquisitions, ed. by A. Auerbach. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago  
Press. 
 
Ayers, B., Lefanowicz, C., Robinson, J., 2000. The Effect of Goodwill Tax Deduction on the  
Market for Corporate Acquisitions. Journal of the American Taxation Association. 
Supplement: 34-50. 
 
Ayers, B., Lefanowicz, C., Robinson, J., 2003. Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition Premiums:  
The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation. Journal of Finance 58: 2783-2801. 
 
Ayers, B., Lefanowicz, C., Robinson, J., 2004. The Effect of Shareholder-level Capital Gains  
Taxes on Acquisition Structure. The Accounting Review 79: 859-887. 
 
Badertscher, B., S. Katz, and S. Rego. 2011. The Impact of Private Equity Ownership on  
Portfolio Firms’ Corporate Tax Avoidance. Working paper. University of Notre 
Dame, Columbia University, and Indiana University. 
 
Balakrishnan, K., J. Blouin, and W. Guay. 2011. Does Tax Aggressiveness Reduce Financial  
Reporting Transparency? Working paper. University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen, and A. Ferrel. 2009. What Matters in Corporate Governance. Review  
of Financial Studies 22: 783-827. 
 
Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen, and C. Wang. 2013. Learning and the Disappearing Association  
between Governance and Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 108: 323-348. 
 
Bhagat, S., M. Dong, D. Hirshleifer, and R. Noah. 2005. Do Tender Offers Create Value?  
New Methods and Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 76: 3-60. 
 
Blitz, G. 2009. FIN 48: Insurance for When the IRS Doesn’t Recognize What You Did. Aon  
Financial Solutions. 
 119 
 
Blouin, J., J. Collins, and D. Shackelford. 2005. Does Acquisition by Non-US Shareholders  
Cause US Firms to Pay Less Tax? The Journal of the American Taxation Association  
27: 25-38. 
 
Boynton, C., P. DeFilippes, E. Legel, and T. Reum. 2011. A First Look at 2007 Schedule M3  
Reporting by Large Corporations. Tax Notes 15: 689-725. 
 
Bradley, M., A. Desai, and E. H. Kim. 1988. Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions  
and their Division between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms. Journal  
of Financial Economics 21: 3-40. 
 
Bris, A., N. Brisley, and C, Cabolis. 2008. Adopting Better Corporate Governance: Evidence  
   from Cross-border Mergers. Journal of Corporate Finance 14: 224-240. 
 
Brown, J. 2011. The Spread of Aggressive Corporate Tax Reporting: A Detailed  
Examination of the Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Shelter. The Accounting  
Review 86: 23-57. 
 
Brown, L. and M. Caylor. 2006. Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation. Journal of  
Accounting and Public Policy 25: 409-434. 
 
Brown, S. and J. Warner. 1985. Using Daily Stock Returns, The Case of Event Studies.  
Journal of Financial Economics 14: 3-31. 
 
Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin. 2010. Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive  
  than Non-Family Firms? Journal of Financial Economics 95: 41-61. 
 
Cheng, A., H. Huang, Y. Li, and J. Stanfield. 2012. The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on  
Corporate Tax Avoidance. The Accounting Review 87: 1493-1526. 
 
Chhaochharia, V. and Y. Grinstein. 2007. Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The  
Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules. Journal of Finance 62: 1789-1825. 
 
Chi, J. 2005. Understanding the Endogeneity between Firm Value and Shareholder Rights.  
Financial Management 34: 65-76. 
 
DeAngelo, H. and R. Masulis. 1980. Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal  
Taxation. Journal of Financial Economics 8: 3-27. 
 
Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney, 1995. Detecting Earnings Management. The  
Accounting Review 70: 193-225. 
 
Desai, M., and D. Dharmapala. 2006. Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered  
Incentives. Journal of Financial Economics 79: 145-179. 
 
 120 
 
Desai, M., and D. Dharmapala. 2008. Tax and Corporate Governance: An Economic  
Approach, Tax and Corporate Governance in MPI Studies on Intellectual Property,  
Competition and Tax Law, 3:1, 13-30. 
 
Desai, M., and D. Dharmapala. 2009. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 91: 537-546. 
 
Desai, M., A. Dyck, and D. Dharmapala. 2007. Theft and Taxes. Journal of Financial  
Economics 84: 591-623. 
 
DeSimone, S., J. Robinson, and B. Stomberg. 2013. Distilling the Reserve for Uncertain Tax  
Positions: The Revealing Case of Black Liquor. Forthcoming, Review of Accounting  
Studies. 
 
Devos, D., P. Kadapakkam, and S. Krishnamurthy. 2009. How do Mergers Create Value? A  
Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations 
for Synergy. Review of Financial Studies 22: 1179-1211. 
 
Dong, M., D. Hirshleifer, S. Richardson, and S. Teoh. 2006. Does Investor Misevaluation  
Drive the Takeover Market? Journal of Finance 61: 725-762. 
 
Dhaliwal, D., M. Erickson, and S. Heitzman. 2004. The Effect of Seller Income Taxes on  
Acquisition Price: Evidence from Purchases of Taxable and Tax-Exempt Hospitals.  
The Journal of the American Taxation Association 26: 1-21. 
 
Dhaliwal, D. and K. Newberry. 2001. Cross-Jurisdictional Income Shifting by U.S.  
Multinationals: Evidence from International Bond Offerings. Journal of Accounting  
Research 39: 643-662. 
 
Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew. 2008. Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance. The  
Accounting Review 83: 61-82. 
 
Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. Maydew. 2010. The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax  
Avoidance. The Accounting Review 85: 1163-1189. 
 
Dyreng, S., B. Lindsey, and J. Thornock. 2012. Exploring the Role of Delaware Plays as a  
Domestic Tax Haven. Journal of Financial Economics 108: 751-772. 
 
Engel, E., M. Erickson, and E. Maydew. 1999. Debt-Equity Hybrid Securities. Journal of  
Accounting Research 37: 249-274. 
 
Erickson, M., and S. Wang. 1999. Earnings Management by Acquiring Firms in Stock for   
Stock  Mergers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 149–176. 
 
Erickson, M. and S. Wang. 2000. The Effect of Transaction Structure on Price: Evidence  
from Subsidiary Sales. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30: 59-97. 
 121 
 
Erickson, M. and S. Wang. 2007. Tax Benefits as a Source of Merger Premium in  
Acquisitions of Private Corporations. The Accounting Review 82: 359-387. 
 
Frank, M., L. Lynch, and S. Rego. 2009. Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to  
Aggressive Financial Reporting. The Accounting Review 84: 467-496. 
 
Fuller, K., J. Netter, M. Stegemoller. 2002. What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us?  
Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions. Journal of Finance 57: 1763- 
1793. 
 
Gallemore, J., E. Maydew, and J. Thornock. 2012. The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance  
and the Under-Sheltering Puzzle. Working paper, University of North Carolina and  
University of Washington. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). 2003. Challenges Remain in Combating Abusive Tax  
Shelters. Washington D. C., Government Printing Office. 
 
Gleason, C. and L. Mills. 2002. Materiality and Contingent Tax Liability Reporting. The  
Accounting Review 77: 317-342. 
 
Gompers, P., J. Ishii, A. Metrick. 2003. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118: 107-155. 
 
Graham, J., M. Hanlon, T. Shevlin, and N. Shroff. 2012. Incentives for Tax Planning and  
Avoidance: Evidence from the Field. Working paper, Duke University, MIT, and 
University of California at Irvine. 
 
Graham, J., A. Tucker. 2006. Tax Shelters and Corporate Debt Policy. Journal of Financial 
Economics 81: 563-594. 
 
Hanlon, M. 2003. What Can We Infer About a Firm’s Taxable Income from its Financial  
Statements? National Tax Journal 56: 831-863. 
 
Hanlon, M. and S. Heitzman. 2010. A Review of Tax Research. Journal of Accounting and  
Economics 50: 127-178. 
 
Hanlon, M., E. Maydew, and D. Saavedra. 2012. Understanding Why Firms Hold So Much  
Cash: A Tax Risk Explanation. Working paper, MIT and University of North  
Carolina. 
 
Hanlon, M. and J. Slemrod. 2009. What does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from  
Stock Price Reactions to News about Tax Shelter Involvement. Journal of Public  
Economics 93: 126-141. 
 
Hardy, K. 2005. Meeting SEC Disclosure Requirements after the Titan Report. DLA Piper. 
 122 
 
Harris, D., R. Morck, J. Slemrod, and B. Yeung. 1993. Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational 
Corporations. In Studies in International Taxation, edited by A. Giovannini, R. G.  
Hubbard, and J. Slemrod. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hartford. 2011. Tax Indemnity Insurance: Transactional Risk Solutions. The Harford  
Financial Services Group, Inc. 
 
Hayn, C. 1989. Tax Attributes as Determinants of Shareholder Gains in Corporate  
Acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 23: 121-153. 
 
Heckman, J. 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47: 153- 
162. 
 
Hines, J. and E. Rice. 1994. Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business.  
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 142-182. 
 
Hutchings, M. 2008. To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Potential Securities Fraud Liability for  
Merger Agreement Representation and Warranties. DLA Piper. 
 
Jarrell, G., J. Brickley, and J. Netter. 1988. The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical  
Evidence Since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 49-68. 
 
Jensen, M. C. and R. Ruback. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific  
Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50. 
 
Jones, J. 1991. Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations.  Journal of  
Accounting Research 29: 193-228. 
 
Kim, B., Y. Li, and L. Zhang. 2011. Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk,  
Firm-Level Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 100: 639-662. 
 
Kimbrough, M. and H. Louis. 2011. Voluntary Disclosure to Influence Investor Reactions to  
Merger Announcements, An Examination of Conference Calls. The Accounting 
Review 86: 637-667. 
 
Klassen, K. and S. Laplante, 2012. Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More  
Aggressive Income Shifters? Journal of Accounting Research 50: 1245-1285. 
 
Koester, A. 2011. Investor Valuation of Tax Avoidance through Uncertain Tax Positions.  
Working paper, Georgetown University. 
 
Lang, M. and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of  
Corporate Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 31: 246-271. 
 
Lang, L., R. Stulz, and R. Walkling.1989. Managerial Performance, Tobin's Q, and the Gains  
from Successful Tender Offers. Journal of Financial Economics 24: 137-154. 
 123 
 
Lisowsky, P. 2010. Seeking Shelter, Empirically Modeling Tax Shelters Using Financial  
Statement Information. The Accounting Review 85: 1693-1720. 
 
Lisowsky, P., L. Robinson, and A. Schmidt. 2013. Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell  
Us About Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity? Journal of Accounting Research  
51: 583-629. 
 
Manzon, G., and G. Plesko. 2002. The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting  
Measures of Income. Tax Law Review 55: 175-214. 
 
Masulis, R., C. Wang, and F. Xie. 2007. Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns.  
Journal of Finance 62: 1851-1889. 
 
McGill, G. and E. Outslay. 2004. Lost in Translation, Detecting Tax Shelter Activity in  
Financial Statements. National Tax Journal 3: 739-756. 
 
McGuire, S. 2009. Voluntary Explanation of Effective Tax Rate Decreases. Working paper,  
Texas A&M University. 
 
McNichols, M. and S. Stubben. 2012. The Effect of Target-Firm Accounting Quality on  
Valuation in Acquisitions. Working paper, Stanford University and University of  
North Carolina. 
 
Mescall, D. and K. Klassen. 2013. How Does Transfer Pricing Risk Affect Premia in Cross- 
Border Mergers and Acquisitions. Working paper, University of Saskatchewan and  
University of Waterloo. 
 
Mills, L. 1998. Book-Tax Differences and Internal Revenue Service Audit Adjustments.  
Journal of Accounting Research 36: 343-356. 
 
Mills, L., M. Erickson, and E. Maydew. 1998. Investments in Tax Planning. Journal of the  
American Taxation Association 20: 1-20. 
 
Moeller, S., F. Schlingemann, and R. Stulz.  2004. Firm Size and the Gains from  
Acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 73: 201-228. 
 
Myers, C. and N. Majluf. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms  
have Information that Investors do not have". Journal of Financial Economics 13:  
187–221. 
 
Officer, M. 2003. Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Financial  
Economics 69: 431-467. 
 
Officer, M., A. Poulsen, and M. Stegemoller. 2009. Target-firm Information Asymmetry and  
Acquirer Returns. Review of Finance 13: 467-493. 
 124 
 
Raman, K., L. Shivakumar, and A. Tamayo. 2013. Target’s Earnings Quality and Bidders’  
Takeover Decisions. Forthcoming, Review of Accounting Studies. 
 
Rego, S. 2003. Tax Avoidance Activities of U.S. Multinational Corporations. Contemporary  
Accounting Research 20: 805-833.  
 
Robinson, J., S. Sikes, and C. Weaver. 2010. Performance Measurement of Corporate Tax  
Departments. The Accounting Review 85: 1035-1080 
 
Servaes, H. 1991. Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers. Journal of Finance 46: 409-419. 
 
Scholes, M., M. Wolfson, M. Erickson, E. Maydew, and T. Shevlin, 2005. Taxes and  
Business Strategy, A Planning Approach, 3th edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ,  
Prentice Hall. 
 
Slemrod, J. and M. Blumenthal. 1993. The Compliance Costs of the US Corporate Income  
Tax for Large Corporations. Corporate Tax Policy Issues. 
 
Travlos, N. 1987. Corporate Takeover Bids, Method of Payment, and Bidding Firm’s Stock  
Returns. Journal of Finance 52: 943-963. 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1999. The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters, Discussion,  
Analysis and Legislative Proposals. Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office. 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003. Internal Revenue Service, Challenges Remain  
in Combating Abusive Tax Shelters, GAO-04-104T. Washington, D.C. 
 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011. Abusive Tax Avoidance Transactions, IRS  
Needs Better Data to Inform Decisions about Transactions. Washington, D.C. 
 
Watchorn, A. 2009. Insuring Tax Risk. The Tax Journal. Willis Group Holdings. 
 
Wilson, R. 2009. An Examination of Corporate Tax Shelter Participants. The Accounting 
Review 84: 969-99. 
 
Wang, C. and F. Xie. 2009. Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic Gains from  
Mergers and Acquisitions. Review of Financial Studies 22: 829-858. 
